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Purpose: This paper aims to identify the relevant factors that inhibit or facilitate knowledge 
transfer in military task forces from the individual to the team or group level. 
Design/methodology/approach: This research employs an empirical research methodology. 
Thirteen interviews were held, which were analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. This 
mixed method was used to enhance the reliability of the research. The interviews were divided in a 
unstructured part in which the respondents were able to indicate which factors were important 
themselves. In the structured part the respondents were asked to rate the importance of the factors 
that were derived from the literature review.  
Findings: The  research found that rationality and prior related knowledge were by far the most 
important both inhibiting as facilitative factor. This means that factors can be both inhibitive as 
facilitative. The research also found that some factors are related and influence each other, and that 
their importance and occurrence vary per situation. 
Academic implications: Unlike other literature on the subject, this study states that factors are 
related. Another new finding is that their relevance varies per situation or context. 
Practical implications: The first implication is that in order to be flexible and effective a task 
force should have a common background or shared mental model. To achieve this the maneuver 
arms commander needs to have a thorough understanding of the different units he commands. The 
second implication is that if integrated task forces were created instead of modular task forces the 
flexibility would be greatly enhanced. 
Originality/value : The value of this paper for academics is that it provides an insight in the 
military that is usually not very accessible for academics. It also showed a new phenomenon that 
certain factors are related. This has not been mentioned before in scientific literature. The value for 
the military is that it shows the value of integrative units. 
Abstract 
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Foreword  
This thesis marks the end of a six-year journey of a young man to become an officer in the Royal 
Netherlands Marine Corps. It also marks the changes which have been set in motion by the 
demands  posed on the military organisation by the increasing complexity of the modern 
battlefield. An officer not only needs to be a warrior, he has to be a scholar as well. This 
combination of warrior/scholar provides him the conceptual capability to deal with the complex 
battlefield in which minor miscalculations may have huge strategic implications. This 
warrior/scholar concept helps the military to move on to the next generation of modern warfare in 
which globalisation, rapid technological developments and social unrest pose new threats to the 
rule of law. 
My inspiration for the subject of knowledge transfer in the military context came from articles on 
the inflexibility of the current bureaucratic organisation and from disturbing informal 
conversations about incidents with casualties that were (partly) the result of miscommunication. I 
started the quest of writing this thesis with my mind set to the purpose and with a sense of urgency. 
In general, I enjoyed the exploration into the dynamics that make a platoon of marines function the 
way they do. The results of this study are as well relevant to the marine corps as to the academic 
world by providing practical applicable recommendations to the corps  and by providing an insight 
into the dynamics of an organisation which is not easily accessible for “outsiders” 
Each marine has to face many challenges, but never faces them alone. A marine always needs a 
‘homefront’ to support him on deployments, but also during challenging military exercises or in 
my case, writing a master thesis. I would like to thank my family for their unrelenting support for 
my profession. The same goes for my girlfriend Gerlinde who spent many hours waiting for me, 
while I was behind the desk working on the thesis, telling her it would only take ‘five more 
minutes’. I would like to thank my old POTOM buddies Chris, Koen, Daan en Antoine. Your 
humor and compassion have always pulled me through when I’m in a tight spot. I would also like 
to thank my many other colleagues for helping me to the best of their abilities. A special thanks is 
for the colleagues that were willing to do an interview with me, and thereby sharing their intimate 
stories about situations in which they were in danger, were afraid or when things went horribly 
wrong. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my tutor miss Neghina. Miss Neghina has 
been most supportive, and her professionalism made me leave her office, usually somewhat 
confused by the huge amount of information and corrections she provided me, but also very eager 
to continue to write the thesis. Carmen, I could not have achieved this result without your 
dedication to your students. Thank you very much! 
Qua Patet Orbis! 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Introduction  
A well-known assumption within the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) states that if you 
can fight in a full scale war, you are able to participate in any military operation that is less violent. 
Factors that have been recently disrupting corporations, such as globalization, or technological and 
social developments have also influenced the conduct of war. Improved communication 
equipment, satellites, improved (aerial) sensors, high-tech weaponry have offered new capabilities 
at the bottom of the organization. These capabilities provide a so-called force multiplier effect. 
This means that the same amount of troops are much more effective than they were compared to 
the situation without these new capabilities. The units that provide these new capabilities are 
referred to as “enablers”. 
More and more military operations have seen an increase in the use of temporary military task 
forces. These are modular teams of infantry and task specific enablers, that are assembled to deal 
with a specific situation within a given time frame. In the business world, these task forces 
resemble project teams assigned a specific project. In an attempt to increase their flexibility and 
adaptability, militaries around the world have started to use similar principles. For instance, during 
the deployment of Dutch troops to the Afghan province Uruzgan, a specific task force was created 
build up from different units of the Dutch armed forces. 
Although the purpose of the task forces is to increase the team’s efficiency, they are often plagued 
by miscommunication, a lack of cooperation or even failure. The military operation in Afghanistan 
has been a test for many of these new capabilities (Waard & Kramer, 2008). Articles on the 
experience from Dutch forces in Afghanistan show the difficulties that arise when infantry has to 
cooperate with the new enablers (Waard & Kramer, 2008). While every unit focussed on 
improving their specific expertise the cooperation between infantry and enablers has seen 
difficulties (Kramer, De Waard, & De Graaff, 2011).  
In order to improve this cooperation knowledge transfer is very important. In the ideal world 
knowledge transfer would automatically take place. However there are several factors that can 
either inhibit or facilitate the transfer of knowledge between members of an organization (Yih-
Tong Sun & Scott, 2005). These factors can be found on the individual, organizational and 
environmental level (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). It is relevant to find out which factors influence 
knowledge transfer, because a shared mental model depends on the process of knowledge transfer 
(Kim, 1993). 
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1.2. Problem statement  
It is no surprise that many theorists have focused on top-down military innovation, because a 
successful change in strategy can be of substantial importance during military operations as well as 
for the balance of power that exists between states. Compared to these major implications, minor 
changes in small unit tactics look very insignificant (Farrel, 2010). However, these minor changes 
can have big implications that determine success of failure of a military campaign (Kahl, 2007).  
This is shown in studies on Iraq and Afghanistan, minor changes to standard operational 
procedures at the bottom of the organization led to profound benefits at the strategic level (Farrel, 
2010; Russel, 2010; Rotmann, Tohn, & Wharton, 2009). This is not surprising because the conduct 
of war has become much more complex and dynamic. The attacks on the Twin Towers were so 
shocking because they did not fit the pattern of Western-style warfare (Osinga, 2007). It 
strengthened interest in Fourth Generation Warfare in which many more dimensions are used to 
conduct warfare, for instance: drugs-, financial-, trade-, propaganda-warfare (Liang & Xiangsui, 
1999; Osinga, 2007).  In order to cope with the complexity and unpredictability of the battlefield a 
team needs to cooperate and share relevant knowledge (Waard & Kramer, 2008). Despite the 
relevance of knowledge sharing in the military, there are still many factors that inhibit learning, 
while other promote it. In practice, knowledge is not always transferred, leading to difficulties on 
the battlefield, and sometimes even casualties. A modus operandi, or shared mental model is 
essential and in order to build such a shared mental model knowledge transfer is needed (Kim, 
1993). 
1.3. Research question  
The study aims to answer the following research question: 
Which individual, organizational and environmental factors influence knowledge transfer in 
a temporary military task force? 
More specifically, the study aims to find answers to the following sub-questions:  
1. Which societal-environmental factors are important for knowledge transfer in a temporary 
military task force? 
2. Which actional-personal factors are important for knowledge transfer in a temporary military 
task force? 
3. Which structural-organizational factors are important for knowledge transfer in a temporary 
military task force? 
4. Which are the most important factors that influence knowledge transfer in a temporary military 
task force? 
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1.4. Contribution 
Contribution for the military 
This research tries to strengthen the government’s ability in general and the military’s ability in 
specific to cope with the enormous complexity of modern day conflicts in which a balance between 
top-down and bottom-up learning is needed (Edmondson, 2012). This will be achieved by studying 
the factors that influence the knowledge transfer within military task forces. Although task forces 
are being increasingly used as a means in the conduct of military operations, few research actually 
investigates what is needed for a task force to be successful. The stakes are very high within the 
military to ensure the success of task forces, with public money and human lives usually at stake. 
We argue that knowledge transfer is the first step towards establishing these successful task forces, 
and aim to provide insights as to which factors facilitate and inhibit knowledge transfer within this 
risky context. 
 
Contribution for commercial organizations 
This research is relevant for commercial organizations as well. Many organizations that struggle 
with matching their old architectural design with the new turbulent environment can be inspired by 
this study how to improve their knowledge transfer capabilities. The study will give insight in 
knowledge transfer in functional and hierarchical organizations. This might be helpful for 
organizations that frequently use temporary teams to achieve their goals (Waard & Kramer, 2008). 
Examples of these are the cooperation between a physician and specialists at the hospital, which 
vary per patient, or the cooperation in the ICT sector between several teams on a software design 
project. Project based teamwork is also a growing trend within the business world, and insights 
into factors that inhibit or enable knowledge transfer are sure to also be relevant outside the 
military context. 
 
Academic contribution  
Research on temporary modular organizations has so far focused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of temporary modular and team design; they argue that teams are very capable of 
dealing with the contemporary complexity of the environment (van den Bosch & Volberda, 2006; 
Kramer, De Waard, & De Graaff, 2011). However, few studies focus on both temporary modular 
organizations, organizational learning and the role knowledge transfer plays in this proces. In order 
to be flexible the transfer of knowledge is key in building holographic capabilities that are needed 
modular design, no study so far has focused on the transfer of knowledge within these flexible 
modular organizations (Kim, 1993; Kramer, De Waard, & De Graaff, 2011; Morgan, 1986). This is 
where this study comes in. 
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This research will combine research on  temporary modular design, organizational learning and 
knowledge transfer in order to gain an overview of the factors that facilitate or inhibit knowledge 
transfer in an temporary modular organization. By looking into the factors that inhibit or facilitate 
knowledge transfer, this study may provide under which circumstances these organizations are 
flexible and which factors inhibit this flexibility. It hereby also complements research on the 
transfer of knowledge and strengthens the current literature on organizational learning in general, 
and knowledge transfer in specific. It provides possible new factors and proves that other factors 
are relevant by studying a case from a military perspective. Most research is conducted in 
commercial organizations (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 2005; Schilling 
& Kluge, 2009). In order to complement the existing literature on knowledge transfer it is 
important to study knowledge transfer in public organizations as well. Studying a public 
organization might provide new insights in the mechanisms that influence knowledge transfer. 
Although this research aims to identify relevant factors in a military context it also confirms the 
relevance of different factors. Some factors are mentioned more than others. This highlights which 
factors are most important. The research also shows whether factors are related to negative or 
positive incidents, or both. This helps understand whether a factor is a typical inhibiter, facilitator 
or that it can be both depending on the situation.  This study uses a different research method that 
combines qualitative and quantitative research. This mixed method is an innovative attempt to 
approach qualitative and quantitative research in a different way. This is important because a 
critique on research of social phenomena is that it focuses too much on quantifying  social factors 
that cannot be quantified (Yukl, 2009).   
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2. Theoretical framework 
Knowledge is an elusive concept. Before going deeper in into the concept of knowledge transfer, 
the definition of knowledge is explored. Knowledge transfer is part of organizational learning so 
the theory on organizational learning is presented and followed by theories on knowledge transfer, 
together with a synthesis of its inhibiting and facilitating factors. 
2.1 Knowledge  
There is a philosophical debate on what knowledge is (Vera & Crossan, 2003).  On the one hand, 
the positivists argue that reality is objective and can be comprehended accurately, while on the 
other hand, the post-modernists argue that all meanings are context specific (Vera & Crossan, 
2003). This discussion is founded in the old debate between Aristotle’s empiricism and Plato’s 
rationalism (Fernie, Green, Weller, & Newcombe, 2003). Although there is an ongoing debate on 
the nature of knowledge, several definitions exist. Fernie et al. (2003) describe it as the individual’s 
ability to make judgments. Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) on the other hand, see knowledge as 
the ability to draw distinctions within a collective domain of action based on an appreciation of 
context or theory. This definition acknowledges the importance of the context or framework in 
which knowledge exists. This definition indicates that knowledge is personal and bound to a 
certain context or individual. This means that knowledge, from a conceptual point of view, is 
difficult to transfer because it is personal and bound to a certain context (Fernie et al, 2003). 
 
Knowledge can be classified as being either tacit or explicit (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Explicit 
knowledge that can be codified in a certain format and tacit knowledge is more intiutive and hard 
to codify (Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 2005).  Knowledge and information are often used 
interchangeably, although they are separate concepts, as knowledge is more than just information 
(Weggeman, 2000). Information exists out of ‘data’ and is also called explicit knowledge (Smith, 
2001). Data are symbolic representations of facts, opinions and variables. Lines, numbers and 
characters are common ways to represent data. Information is created from data when a certain 
data is put in a certain context. This means information only exists when meaning is given to 
certain data (Weggeman, 2000).  A machine is not able to give meaning to certain data except for 
what the algorithms within his system indicate. Only individuals can give meaning to data and 
thereby create information. This means that information, and thus knowledge, can not exist without 
the individual (Weggeman, 2000). The consequence of this is that knowledge is tied to individuals. 
Information is not the only relevant component of knowledge. Knowledge on how to perform a 
certain task depends also on certain experiences, skills and attitude of the subject. Experience is 
familiarization through time with a certain task or phenomenon which makes capable of 
performing a certain task (Weggeman, 2000). Skills are divided in two types: exogenous and 
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endogenous. Exogenous skills contain communicative, expressive, craftsmanship skills. 
Endogenous skills contain analytic, intuitive, creative, and reflective skills (Weggeman, 2000). 
Attitude consist of a set of basic believes. This kind of knowledge is also referred to as tacit 
knowledge (Smith, 2001). 
 
Knowledge can be defined as the (unaware) capability that enables a person to execute a certain 
task (Weggeman, 2000), a capability which is the function of: information, experience, skills and 
attitude that someone possesses at a time: K= f(I×ESA) (Weggeman, 2000). This definition will be 
used in this research due to its practical applicability and clear distinction between different parts 
of knowledge. This formula indicates that knowledge has two components that can be identified, 
but not separated (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Explicit knowledge is represented by the 
information component in the formula and tacit knowledge is represented by experience, skills and 
attitudes. This research uses Weggeman’s (2000) definition of knowledge because it leaves out the 
conceptual uncertainties in the nature of knowledge. 
2.2 Organizational learning  
This chapter focuses on the basics of organizational learning and the role knowledge transfer plays 
in this process. All organizations learn, whether they actively try to pursue this goal or not (Kim, 
1993). As mentioned earlier, learning and knowledge management are vital to formulate a strategy 
that sustains success in the future (Man, 2003). According to the practice-based perspective on 
knowledge, knowledge is embodied in people and inseparable from practice and culture (Hislop, 
2009). The construct of organizational learning is still quite vague (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Kim, 
1993). To understand organizational learning, this research will go deeper into the construct of 
knowledge and how it is transferred within an organization by presenting factors that facilitate or 
inhibit learning. 
In order to comprehend organization learning, a model from Daniel H. Kim (1993) is used because 
it offers a comprehensive model linking knowledge and learning in organizations. The model is 
known as the OADI-SMM model and consists of the following steps: observe, assess, design, 
implement-shared mental model. The model shows that knowledge is transferred by an exchange 
and adaption of individual and shared mental models and that individual learning fuels 
organizational learning which enables the organization to take effective action (Kim, 1993). 
Kim (1993) states that individual learning is what generates knowledge. An individual learns 
through doing and experimenting. Each time the individual takes an action and goes through the 
observe, asses, design and implement stage of individual learning he/she learns and generates 
individual knowledge that is stored in his/her individual model. Different outcomes from the 
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individual learning process will change an individual’s framework or belief and the routines he/she 
has. For instance, if a person has only seen white swans and no black swans, he will assume there 
are only white swans, until the day he sees a black swan. Once he spots a black swan, the person 
can change his individual mental model towards a more general statement of swans can be both 
black and white (Kim, 1993). 
Kim (1993, p.39) describes the individual mental model as: “a representation of an individual’s 
view on the world, including implicit and explicit understandings”. Mental models provide the 
context in which to view and interpret new material, and they determine how stored information is 
relevant to a given situation (Kim, 1993). They represent more than a collection of ideas, memories 
and experiences- they are like the source code of a computer’s operating system, the manager and 
arbiter of acquiring, retaining, using and deleting new information. But they are much more than 
that because they are also like the programmer of that source code with the know how to design a 
different source code as well as the know-why to choose on over the other. 
The individual mental model consists of routines and frameworks that are dependent on each other 
(Kim, 1993).The framework is the conceptual part of the model which influences the way we view 
the world and the routines are the operational part (Kim, 1993). These are the more practical 
procedures. This way the knowledge that was generated in the individual learning process is 
codified in the individual mental model (Kim, 1993). If he/she tells somebody else about his 
sighting of a black swan knowledge transfer occurs. The information about the black swan has now 
been received and the other person has “observed” the fact that there is a black swan. Knowledge 
transfer has occurred. If the other person completes his individual learning cycle and accepts the 
fact there are black swans as well, learning has occurred. His individual mental model has now 
been influenced the others individual’s mental model and we can now speak of a shared mental 
model, because at least two individuals share the same knowledge on swans. 
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Figure 1 Knowledge transfer adopted from Kim (1993) 
Figure 2 depicts this process of building a shared mental model. This is no longer illustrative of 
individual learning but rather of group learning. The shared mental model is the same as the 
individual mental model from Figure1, but it represents a mental model that is shared between 
several individuals (Kim, 1993).  
 
Figure 2 Shared mental model adopted from Kim (1993) 
2.3 Transfer of knowledge 
The sharing of knowledge is defined as “a process of mutual perspective taking where distinctive 
individual knowledge is exchanged, evaluated and integrated with that of others in the 
organization” (Hislop, 2009, p. 45). Therefore, knowledge transfer is the process of knowledge 
sharing, both conceptual and operational knowledge between the individual mental model and the 
shared mental model. Conceptual and operational knowledge complement each other and are 
dependent variables (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). 
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Figure 3 The four I model (Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck & Kleysen, 2005) 
 
The 4I model (Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck & Kleysen, 2005) offers a way to comprehend the transfer 
of knowledge and link it to several levels in organizations (Figure 3). According to the 4I model, 
knowledge transfer can be divided in four phases: intuiting, interpreting, integrating and 
institutionalizing (Lawrence et al, 2005). The intuiting phase is the individual learning phase in 
which an organizational member learns from personal insights and experiences. The interpreting 
phase is the phase in which the individual influences not only his own individual mental model but 
those around him as well. In the integrating phase, the new knowledge has successfully adjusted 
the group’s mental model. In the institutionalizing phase, the organization actively imposes the 
new knowledge on the whole organization. The knowledge is now fully embedded in the 
weltanschauung of the organization and is no longer bound to a certain group and organizational 
learning has occurred (Lawrence et al, 2005).  This research focuses on temporary tailor-made 
organizations. This means that only the knowledge transfer between the individual and the group is 
examined, respectively the intuition and interpretation phase. There are several factors that 
facilitate or hinder the process of knowledge transfer. These will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
2.4 What are the facilitators and inhibiters to knowledge transfer? 
The transfer of knowledge is not a process that happens automatically. There are various factors 
that influence the level of knowledge transfer. Just like the organizational learning theory, research 
into knowledge transfer is still very fragmented and vague (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). Literature on 
organizational learning in general, and more specifically on knowledge transfer provides insight 
into various factors that influence knowledge transfer. This research divides these factors in 
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actional-personal, structural-organizational and societal-environmental factors (Schilling & Kluge, 
2009). Actional-personal factors include cognition, motivation, emotion and identity. Structural-
organizational factors include barriers to freedom to think creatively due to much regulation or the 
lack of clear goals. Societal-environmental factors focus on characteristics of knowledge, 
characteristics of the branch and broad social frames (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). This research has 
extracted several factors from different articles on organizational learning and knowledge transfer.  
The organizational learning literature is important for this research because knowledge transfer is 
an integral part of organizational learning. Research on organizational learning has grown a tenfold 
from 1990 to 2000 (Bapiju & Crossan, 2004). However, the lack of a consistent organizational 
theory inherently influences the theory on knowledge transfer (Crossan, Maurer, & White, 2011). 
Researchers approach organizational learning from  a number of perspectives and disciplines 
(Crossan et al, 2011). This makes it difficult to create a coherent theoratical framework because 
there are so many perspectives which are difficult to unify, as observed by Crossan et al. (2011, pg. 
447): “Frankly, some of the past research is not worthy of being unified. Without that critical 
insight, it is difficult to establish the ground for theory development.”.  This inconsistency also 
influences this research.  
The oldest article used in this literature review on knowledge transfer, which has been consulted is 
from Yih-Tong Sun and Scott (2005). This study is aimed specifically at factors that inhibit 
knowledge transfer. It provides factors at all levels in the organization. However, as mentioned 
before this research focuses on the knowledge transfer between the individual and the group. This 
article makes a distinction between factors and different sources that influence them. Sources 
include i.e. team climate, structure and relationships. A point of critique on this study is that it does 
not define what the source is and what exactly differentiates it from a barrier. According to Yih-
Tong Sun and Scott (2005), multiple sources can have influence on multiple factors. This indicates 
a kind of interrelation between different factors, in the sense that they can have the same source. 
Because the distinction between sources and factors is not clarified, this thesis will not differentiate 
between sources and factors.  
 
The next article is from Schilling and Kluge (2009). Schilling and Kluge (2009) have conducted a 
literature review on factors that contribute or hinder organizational learning in general. Despite the 
fact that this article is focused on organizational learning in general, specific factors concerning 
knowledge transfer could be extracted as well. This way, this study provides several factors that 
either inhibit or facilitate knowledge transfer. They also use Yih-Tong Sun and Scott(2005) in their 
review. Schilling and Kluge (2009) differ from Yih-Tong Sun and Scott (2005) by adding several 
new factors as can be seen in Table 1. The most important addition is the knowledge itself. While 
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Yih-Tong Sun and Scott (2005) focus on persons and the organization, Schilling and Kluge (2009) 
incorporate the knowledge itself and its characteristics as a relevant factor. 
 
Schilling and Kluge (2009) have amassed quite some perspectives on inhibiters of organizational 
learning, but there are two points of critique on this article, namely unclear definitions and 
overlapping factors. 
The first point of critique on in this study is that it does not clearly define the relevant factors. Each 
paragraph on a factor ends with a certain proposition that combines several factors and sources that 
are relevant to organizational learning, hereby mixing several factors from different organizational 
levels. This makes this article hard to read, because it appears that the factors are just randomly 
picked and put into a proposition. For instance Proposition 1: “Monolithic corporate cultures, a 
homogeneous workforce, high stocks and inventories, a lack of clear and measurable goals, and 
of knowledge concerning failure analysis, are positively related to superstitious learning and 
negatively related to the detection of performance gaps and errors.” (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). 
This proposition combines several factors, but their interrelation to combine them in one 
proposition is not made clear. 
The second point is that several factors this article present overlap in some cases. For instance 
these two factors: “Status culture” and “ low status, confidence and trustworthiness of the 
innovator” or “strict work rules and regulations” and “narrow job descriptions and high 
division of labour (‘not my job’-phenomenon)”.  
Despite the ambiguity of some of the factors the article is still very useful when combined with 
other articles to verify several factors. That is why apart from the earlier mentioned articles, the 
article of Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) is used to complement the factors provided by the 
other two articles. Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) provide an overview of literature concerning 
knowledge transfer. Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) is the most recent article on knowledge 
transfer that is used in this research and provides an overview of new factors that have not been 
mentioned in other articles, such as emotion and location. Furthermore, it confirms several other 
factors that were mentioned in the other two articles as can be seen in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Factors that influence knowledge transfer overview 
Factors that influence 
individual to team 
Schilling and 
Kluge (2009) 
Argote and Miron-Spektor 
(2011) 
Sun and Scott 
(2005) 
Knowledge characteristics X X  
Rationality X   
Communicative skills X  X 
Motivation X X  
Prior related knowledge X X  
Division of labor X X  
Organizational anxiety X   
Status and hierarchy X  X 
Group identity X  X 
Personality differences X  X 
Divergent objectives X  X 
Location   X  
Emotion   X  
 
The research limits itself to a case study in which all the different units are in one location. That is 
why location is not included in this research. The factor emotion is left out, because the 
respondents of the organization are not likely to talk about emotions and the research will 
encounter too much defensive mechanisms that would hamper a reliable outcome for the factor 
emotion. 
2.4.1. Societal-environmental factors 
The societal environmental factors include the characteristics of the knowledge itself and the 
characteristics of the market an organization has to survive in (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). Only 
knowledge characteristics are discussed because variables induced by the market differ per market. 
Since this research deals with factors that can be generalized the market induced factors are 
neglected.  The characteristics of the knowledge itself are explained first because the distinction 
that is being made between two types of knowledge and skills: tacit and explicit knowledge and 
exogenous and endogenous skills is important for understanding other factors (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Weggeman, 2000).   
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Characteristics of the knowledge 
As indicated before, there are two types of knowledge: tacit and explicit knowledge (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). The differences between the two types of knowledge lie in three major areas 
(Lam, 2000). The first area is the way knowledge can be coded and other mechanisms for 
transferring knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be codified. This means that it can be stored and 
transferred with symbols and it can more easily be shared (Weggeman, 2000). However, most of 
human knowledge is tacit (Polanyi, 1962), which is more intuitive and is difficult to codify 
(Weggeman, 2000) and communicate without having an understanding of the subject (Hislop, 
2009). That is because tacit knowledge usually refers to practical knowledge and skills that are 
gained through practical experience. This means that tacit knowledge is quite hard to transfer in 
comparison to explicit knowledge because explicit knowledge can be transferred across time and 
space independently (Lam, 2000). The transfer of tacit knowledge requires close interaction and a 
shared understanding. The second area of difference is the methods for the acquisition and 
accumulation of knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be obtained through rational analysis and 
study (Lam, 2000) while tacit knowledge must be obtained through practical experience in a 
certain context. This involves a variety of different experiences in a certain context. This ‘variety’ 
and ‘involvement in a certain context’ are crucial factors in obtaining tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 
1994). The third area of difference is the way the two types of knowledge can be used (Lam, 
2000). Explicit knowledge can be used and stored in a single location without participation of the 
knowing subject. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is personal and contextual and in order to 
make full use of it requires a close involvement and cooperation of the knowing subject is required 
(Lam, 2000). This means that, in general, explicit knowledge is more easily transferred than tacit 
knowledge.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The type of knowledge that needs to be transferred determines the medium, 
the effort, the context and the time it takes to acquire certain tacit or explicit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1962). 
 
2.4.2. Actional- personal factors 
Actional-personal factors are relevant for knowledge transfer at the individual level. They focus on 
characteristics of the individual. These factors include the ability of the organizational member to 
perform, and his motivation to do so. The ability factor is subdivided in his rational ability and his 
communicative ability. The motivation factor is divided in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. These 
factors will now be further explained. 
20 
 
The rational ability of the organizational members 
Members of an organization experience bias when they learn due to their pre-existing mental 
framework (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). The individual’s framework is like the spectacles through 
which he sees the world. This leads to several psychological phenomena such as the confirmation 
bias (Huber, 1991). The confirmation bias makes the individual pay attention to experiences that 
confirm his views rather than experiences that contradict them. This means that knowledge may 
not be transferred and obtained in the individual’s mental model because it does not fit the 
framework. Another psychological trap is superstitious learning which makes individuals wrongly 
interpret success a consequence of their actions (Levitt & March, 1988). This may lead to the 
wrong ideas being obtained in the shared mental models. Apart from this actional-personal bias to 
learning, structural-organizational and societal-environmental factors also important in fostering 
these psychological phenomena (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). The organization as a whole can fall in 
the confirmation bias trap as well. Organizations tend to focus on successes and thereby create a 
more monolithic corporate culture with a homogeneous workforce. This limits the acceptance of 
new ideas that conflict with the existing framework within an organization and strengthens the 
confirmation bias (Sitkin, 1996). This phenomenon of an organization falling into the confirmation 
bias trap can be a cause for group identity, which is elaborated in detail in the structural-
organizational paragraph. An individual’s rational ability could allow him to spot these biases and 
be critical in his reasoning , therefore contributing to better knowledge transfer (Schilling & Kluge, 
2009). 
Rational ability: “These include a variety of psychological phenomena, such as the 
confirmation bias (i.e. the tendency to search for information that confirms the own views 
rather than contradicts them) as well as the lack of relevant knowledge on the part of the 
organizational members, which result in superstitious learning. Superstitious learning 
means interpreting organizational success as caused by managerial actions.” (Schilling & 
Kluge, 2009, p. 344). 
 
Hypotheses 2: Rational ability positively influences knowledge transfer.  
 
The communicative ability of the organizational members 
The communicative skill of an organizational member is an exogenous skill as described in the 
chapter on knowledge. Even if an organizational member has relevant knowledge to transfer to his 
other organizational members the social and communicative skills are very important for the 
acceptance (Lawrence et al, 2005). The ability of the individual to communicate his view is a 
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major factor for the acceptance of his opinion. It is possible that an individual may not succeed in 
convincing other individuals although he has a very good concept in mind, due to his poor 
communicative skills (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). 
Communicative ability: “This involves the skills in expressing any thoughts or information 
in your mind.” (Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 2005, p. 81)  
Hypotheses 3: Communicative ability positively influences knowledge transfer. 
 
The personal differences between the organizational members 
 A positive relation between the innovator and the interpreter is vital. Especially when tacit 
knowledge is involved, because tacit knowledge requires a close relation and multiple 
communication acts (Szulanski, 2003). Personal differences may hamper the relation that exists 
between two individuals (Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 2005). 
Personal differences: “(lack of rapport within individual members) You may have difference 
because of the differences in individual character (e.g. introvert, extrovert etc.) or 
differences in their tastes, preferences etc.” (Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 2005, p. 81) 
Hypotheses 4: Personal differences between individual members inhibit knowledge transfer. 
Organizational member motivation 
Motivation is also considered an important factor in the transfer of knowledge (Argote & Miron-
Spektor, 2011). Motivation can be divided in intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation 
(Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Extrinsic motivation means that organizational members are able to 
satisfy their needs indirectly. The most common example of this is monetary compensation. 
Extrinsic motivation is generated by aligning the employee’s monetary motives with the goals of 
the firm (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Intrinsic motivation means that organizational members are able 
to satisfy their needs directly through the task they perform. This means that ideal task will 
generate satisfaction and fulfillment for the employee that performs the task (Osterloh & Frey, 
2000). 
Intrinsic motivation has great advantages, especially in industries where prices and markets play 
only a limited role. Intrinsic motivation is needed in the transfer of tacit knowledge, because it 
generally takes more effort to obtain tacit knowledge. The transfer of tacit knowledge is hard to 
monitor, and is thereby difficult to reward in a monetary way (Osterloh & Frey, 2000).  Explicit 
knowledge, however, can be monitored. This makes it easier to reward people and makes extrinsic 
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motivation much more relevant for the transfer of explicit knowledge (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). 
Putting a competitive reward system in place might lead to competition between organizational 
members. Organizational members might withhold knowledge in this situation. 
Organizational member motivation: The distinction between explicit and tacit forms of 
knowledge is linked to the different kinds of motivation (extrinsic and intrinsic) and are crucial 
for generating and transferring the two forms of knowledge (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). 
Hypotheses 5a: Extrinsic motivation facilitates the sharing of explicit knowledge. 
Hypotheses 5b: Intrinsic motivation facilitates the sharing of tacit knowledge.  
 
2.4.3. Structural-organizational factors 
Structural-organizational factors deal with factors that are caused by the organization itself. These 
include the prior related knowledge, division of labor, organizational anxiety, hierarchy and status 
and group identity. These factors focus on both structural aspects of an organization as the 
organizational culture of the organization.  
Divergent objectives 
Clear goals are important because successful knowledge transfer occurs when there is a 
discrepancy between the knowledge that is transferred and the knowledge that is stored in the 
mental model. When a gap between what is desired and what is achieved is not spotted, routines 
and frameworks will be maintained (Kim, 1993). This means that if an organization does not have 
clear measurable goals it is hard to spot so called gaps between the desired and the achieved result. 
Divergent objectives: “The less an idea is coupled with important goals or costly errors, the 
lower is its acceptance by other team members (especially under circumstances of high 
workload and frontline context).” (Schilling & Kluge, 2009, p. 348) 
 
Hypotheses 6: Clear goals facilitate knowledge sharing. 
 
Prior related knowledge 
The underpinning of prior related knowledge is that the individual already needs to own certain 
knowledge in order to obtain knowledge. Prior related knowledge enhances the transfer of 
knowledge because it enables the learning individual to embed the new knowledge in a knowledge 
structure he already acquired (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This means that when knowledge is 
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already in an individual’s framework it is easier to generate new routines that fit within that 
framework. The ideal knowledge structure would be an organization in which each subunit can 
relate to an overlapping common framework without losing too much diversity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). This overlap might foster what can be called cross-function prior related 
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Research has shown that a certain similarity between units 
improves knowledge transfer (Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000). 
 
Prior related knowledge: the development of memory is a self-reinforcing concept. When more 
facts, patterns and concepts are stored in the memory, new related knowledge is more easily 
acquired. It is also much more facile for the individual to apply them in new settings (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). 
Hypothesis 7: Prior related knowledge facilitates knowledge transfer.  
Division of labor 
Planning and control are important tools for coordinating the effort within an organization, but too 
much regulation may prove suffocating for the transfer of knowledge (Kim, 1993).  Organizations 
tend to focus and specialize in success and try to get efficiency advantages out of standardization 
(Taino, Lilja, & Santalainen, 2001).  This high level of standardization might make it harder for 
members of an organization to adjust to different circumstances because they do not experience 
anything other than what is determined by the organizational routines (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). 
This is especially true in an organization with a strict division of labor. Strict job descriptions not 
only describe what to do but also what not to do. Problems that reach beyond several 
functionalities may not be solved because due to the ‘not my job phenomenon’ (Morgan, 1986). 
The professional role that an organizational member can have also undermines the motivation to 
initiate transfer of knowledge that reaches beyond his or her area of expertise (Szulanski, 2003).  
 
Division of labor: “In an organizational context of strict division of labor, organizational 
members are rewarded for accomplishing their primary tasks, and therefore tend to focus on 
these.” (Schilling & Kluge, 2009, p. 345). 
Hypothesis 8: A strong division of labor is negatively related to the transfer of knowledge. 
Organizational anxiety 
An innovative member of an organization might be reluctant to transfer knowledge because of 
organizational anxiety (Argyris, 1990). In an organization with a blame and shame culture, an 
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organizational member will be careful not to get involved in unsuccessful proposals. They fear 
being branded and associated with the failed project. Which may even result in a decrease in 
rewards for the specific individual (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001). Another fear is that other 
members find their findings unimpressive or that the organizational member fears a loss of 
individual competitive advantage (Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 2005). Organizational members will 
also stop transfer of knowledge if it threatens their own job and professional identity (Argyris, 
1990). This phenomena can be reinforced by a restrictive, controlling management style and an 
organizational blame culture (Schein, 1993). A corporate culture thus can facilitate that 
organizational members choose to remain silent even when faced with organizational problems. 
This is called ‘organizational silence’ (Wolfe Morrison & Milliken, 2000). 
Organizational anxiety: “A restrictive, controlling management style and an organizational 
blame culture are positively related to anxiety, lack of psychological safety, hopelessness 
and organizational cynicism, which are all positively related to actively suppressing novel 
insights and ideas.” (Schilling & Kluge, 2009, p. 346). 
 
Hypothesis 9: Organizational anxiety inhibits knowledge transfer.  
 
Hierarchy and status 
Another social factor that influences the transfer of knowledge is the relations among the 
organizational members (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). An organization with a strict hierarchy and an 
organizational culture that is status orientated will find knowledge much more agreeable when the 
innovator has a high status. The acceptance is based on the status of the innovator than on the 
content of the knowledge itself (Coopey, 1995). New organizational members find it harder to 
successful transfer knowledge because they do not have the same trust from their colleagues (Yih-
Tong Sun & Scott, 2005; Coopey, 1995). A positive relation between the innovator and the 
interpreter is vital, especially when tacit knowledge is involved, because tacit knowledge requires a 
close relation and multiple communication acts (Szulanski, 2003).  
Hierarchy and status: “A lack of status and conflictual relationship to the group are 
negatively related to the acceptance of new ideas by other team members.” (Schilling & 
Kluge, 2009, p. 348) 
 
Hypotheses 10a: A lack of status  inhibits the transfer of knowledge. 
Hypotheses 10b: A lower position within the organization inhibits the transfer of knowledge. 
25 
 
 
Group identity 
Norms and values of a group, as well as the collective identity of an organization contribute to the 
acceptance or rejection of knowledge (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). Failure and risk avoidance 
hamper the transfer of knowledge as well as knowledge that might harm the collective identity. A 
moderate collective identity would be the best for acceptance of knowledge (Schilling & Kluge, 
2009). The knowledge needs to be compatible with the ruling norms, values and identity to be 
eagerly accepted. Only in times in crisis are organizational members with a strong identity 
prepared to make concessions to a change in their framework (Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 2005). This 
could explain why single-loop learning that involves changing routines instead of frameworks is 
the most common form of learning (Schilling & Kluge, 2009). 
Group identity: “The preservation of one’s professional identity (i.e. professional self-
esteem and self-efficacy) might prove a problem to OL under certain circumstances.” 
(Schilling & Kluge, 2009, p. 345) 
 
Hypothesis 11: Strong professional identities inhibit knowledge transfer.  
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Conclusion  
The mentioned factors all constitute to the figure depicted below. This table gives an overview of the different factors. 
Table 2 Factors that influence knowledge transfer 
Societal-
environmental factors 
Characteristics of the 
knowledge 
 
Hypothesis 1: The type of knowledge that needs to be transferred determines the medium, 
the effort, the context and the time it takes to acquire certain tacit or explicit knowledge. 
Actional- personal 
factors 
The rational ability of the 
organizational members 
 
Hypothesis 2: Rational ability positively influences knowledge transfer. 
 The communicative ability of 
the organizational members 
Hypothesis 3: Communicative ability positively influences knowledge transfer. 
 
 The personal differences 
between the organizational 
members 
Hypothesis 4: Personal differences between individual members inhibit knowledge transfer. 
 
 Organizational member 
motivation 
Hypothesis 5a: Extrinsic motivation facilitates the sharing of explicit knowledge. 
Hypothesis 5b: Intrinsic motivation facilitates the sharing of tacit knowledge.  
Structural-
organizational factors 
Divergent objectives 
 
Hypothesis 6: Clear goals facilitate knowledge sharing. 
 
 Prior related knowledge 
 
Hypothesis 7: prior related knowledge facilitates knowledge transfer.  
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 Division of labor 
 
Hypothesis 8: A strong division of labor is negatively related to the transfer of knowledge. 
 
 Organizational anxiety 
 
Hypothesis 9: Organizational anxiety inhibits knowledge transfer.  
 
 Hierarchy and status 
 
Hypothesis 10a: A lack of status  inhibits the transfer of knowledge. 
Hypothesis 10b: A lower position within the organization inhibits the transfer of knowledge. 
 
 Group identity 
 
Hypothesis 11: Strong professional identities inhibit knowledge transfer.  
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3. Research context 
 
In order to cope with the increasing demand for flexibility and adaptation, the Dutch Armed Forces 
use forms of temporarily organizing in the hope of increasing the flexibility of the organization 
(Defensie, 2010). Modularity and temporary organizations are key concepts in the Dutch concept 
of the expeditionary armed forces in order to improve its configuration flexibility (Defensie, 2010). 
This means that when the government decides to dedicate troops to conduct military operations 
abroad various units from the Navy, Air force, Army and Military Police get combined in a 
temporary tailor-made task force which  is suited for the operation at hand.  A research by de 
Waard and Kramer (2008) showed that although this system enhanced the composition flexibility 
of the Dutch Armed Forces, the operational flexibility suffered. This can be explained by the fact 
that the deployed task force gets deployed in a dynamic and complex environment in which it faces 
many uncertainties and opponents that try to undermine the execution of the operation (Waard & 
Kramer, 2008). These circumstances force the task force to quickly adapt to its environment and 
this implies more than putting together a task force build out of loose components. The operational 
flexibility suffers because most modules or components are not able to coordinate as effectively as 
they could compared to a situation in which they were fully integrated for a longer period of time 
(Waard & Kramer, 2008). This would enhance the coordination between the different components. 
Thus, composition flexibility comes at the price of operational flexibility (Waard & Kramer, 2008). 
In the case of task forces sent by the Netherlands to Uruzgan the different components had a six 
month period to sort themselves out and improve coordination. When these preparation times are 
not available operational flexibility will certainly suffer (Waard & Kramer, 2008). In order to gain 
the operational flexibility to deal with the dynamic complexity, a task force needs building blocks 
that are interoperable with each other so they can coordinate their efforts. A research by Weick 
(1993) confirms the problems a newly established team faces when it has to deal with complex 
situations.  
 A task force is usually built around a framework unit that also provides the Manoeuvre Arms 
Commander (MAC) who coordinates the effort of the various units within the task force. In typical 
land operations, this usually is the infantry commander. In a Afghanistan scenario, a patrol may 
look like depicted below.  
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Figure 4 Possible organization of a military task force 
A patrol may hold various other units but this research restricts itself to units that provide a kinetic 
effect. This means that these enablers provide physical effects on the battlefield. Non-kinetic 
effects are soft power like psychological effects. The units will now be introduced. 
The infantry 
The infantry is the most basic but also the best known unit in the armed forces. They are the grunts 
that take the fight directly to the enemy. Many movies have been dedicated to the infantry i.e. Band 
of Brothers, Black Hawk Down, A Bridge too Far etc. Scenes from these movies speak to the 
imagination of many and when the armed forces are discussed people often think of the armed 
forces based on what they have seen in the movies. This provides a distorted picture from reality. 
As mentioned in the introduction the reality has gotten much more complex. Despite all the 
changes the infantry remains the main unit of the armed forces. In order to deal with any violent 
opponent, you will eventually need the infantry to defeat him in close combat. The infantry forms 
the framework to which all the other enablers are attached to. 
Fire support team (FST) 
The availability of enhanced radios, target acquisition equipment, and the abundant availability of 
direct and indirect fire support both on land, air and sea has created the need for specialists that are 
capable of directing and deconflicting the various assets like naval gunfire, close air support and 
mortar fire missions. The FST provides the infantry with a whole range of effects, from 
observation to destruction, show of force and advice. FST commanders in the RNLMC are usually 
experienced infantry officers and are able provide the maneuver arms commander with relevant 
advice not only on his own specialization but also on the handling of the infantry unit. 
Viking 
The Viking BV S10 is an armored amphibious personnel carrier that, with its tracks, is capable of 
maneuvering through arctic, dessert and jungle conditions. The use of Vikings is different from the 
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normal infantry routines that most marines employ. The limited situational awareness, higher 
speeds, fuel expenditure and mounted contact drills are unfamiliar to marine infantry which are 
usually trained in dismounted tactics. In Afghanistan, the complexity of mounted patrols by Viking 
was greatly reduced due to the limited maneuverability  Vikings had because of the many 
improvised explosive devices that were hidden beside the roads. 
Assault engineers 
Assault engineers provide some essential capabilities. They are capable of making manholes in 
houses by use of explosives. They are also the experts when it comes to detecting booby traps and 
road side improvised explosive devices. The assault engineers enjoyed a very high status during 
the Afghanistan deployment due to huge threat from road side improvised explosive devices. 
Fire support platoon 
Like the FST, the fire support platoon is a new concept within the RNLMC. It provides the 
maneuver arms commander with fire support that is directly attached to the platoon. While the FST 
uses assets that can be assigned to you for a short period of time, the fire support platoon offers 
assets like snipers, 81 mm mortar and a heavy weapon section that will be able to support you for 
the duration of an operation. This means that the maneuver arms commanders has the availability 
of effects like improved observation/situational awareness, blinding effect by smoke,  a bigger area 
which can be attacked by snipers, .50 caliber machine gun or 81 mm mortar. All these different 
capabilities have their own specialties, advantages and limitations. An officer with infantry 
experience is attached to the fire support platoon to coordinate its effects and advice the maneuver 
arms commander. 
 Examples of other non-kinetic units that may be attached to such an patrol are the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) or Psychological Operations Team (PSCHYOPS). These will not be 
included in the research. The framework unit in this case is the infantry. All the other units are 
called enablers. They are attached to the infantry to grant it extra capabilities and combat power. 
Although the research is already focussed on the infantry, it is further limited to the deployment of 
three rotations of Marine infantry companies from the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) 
in Afghanistan. This means that all the framework infantry units that are examined are from the 
RNLMC. However, the marine infantry sometimes had army enablers like the Fire Support Team 
(FST) or engineers attached. The difference between enablers from the army and the RNLMC is 
that enablers from the RNLMC all have spent considerable time serving in the infantry before they 
specialised. Enablers from the army are far more specialised and do not share the same infantry 
background. The MAC has an infantry mental model, but has to coordinate enablers with different 
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capabilities. The army enablers do not share any common background with the MAC. They are 
more specialised as a result of the more functional division of labor within the army. So there is 
less overlap of mental models between the MAC and army enablers. 
 
Figure 5 MAC and enablers with their different framework (proposed model) 
 
The Dutch armed forces are facing a knowledge transfer problem. In order to gain flexibility, the 
Dutch armed forces have adopted the concept of a tailor-made temporary organization that fits the 
needs of a specific operation. Although this appears to be a good measure to gain flexibility, 
research has shown that although the configuration of these temporary organizations is quite 
flexible, the operational flexibility suffers because the different building blocks of the so called 
‘task force’ are not as interoperable as required (Waard & Kramer, 2008). The building blocks lack 
an overall understanding of each other, a so called shared mental model. This is depicted in the 
figure above. The MAC does not have any knowledge of the enablers embedded in his mental 
model. The enablers do have the infantry mental model combined with their specialization. A 
shared mental model is created through the transfer of knowledge between the individual and the 
group or taskforce in this case (Waard & Kramer, 2008). The transfer of knowledge is very much 
inhibited and this means that task forces are quite flexible from a top-down perspective but at the 
bottom they are not capable of working together as they should, due to the lack of knowledge 
transfer (Waard & Kramer, 2008). The Dutch military thus faces a severe knowledge transfer 
problem. This research will focus on factors that inhibit or facilitate knowledge transfer on the 
individual and team level within a temporary military task force.   
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4. Methodology  
4.1. Research Design 
The research model can be described as a study on scientific literature on organizational learning 
and knowledge transfer. Criteria are derived from this literature study that are used to evaluate 
knowledge transfer within the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps at the temporary task force level.  
From the comparison of the evaluation between the different research objects several 
recommendations can be made to the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps to enhance the knowledge 
transfer on the task force level and improve the interoperability of the different modules within the 
task force. 
 
 
Figure 6 Research design model adopted from (Verschuur & Doorewaard, 2007) 
 
The information on the different modules of the task force are gathered by use of the source and 
method triangulation. Several sources and methods are used to get a good insight in the case 
organization. These will now be described. 
First documentation on the temporary taskforces are analysed. Documents from the ministry of 
defence and articles on the cooperation on the task force level are analysed. These documents 
include doctrines like joint defence publication 5: command and control, articles out of the 
scientific military journals like the ‘Militaire Spectator’ and the  ´Marineblad´ and documents 
33 
 
from  the website of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. These were used to complement the 
background information on the military task force, and how it functions. 
Second, the author is part of the research object for several years and has participated several times 
in the organization and therefore can use his experiences as a form of participant observation. 
During many weeks living and working among the research objects and after conducting several 
informal conversations and shadowing a task force commander, the author has a reasonable 
impression on the research objects. This is essential for interpreting and understanding interviews 
with the respondents, because in order to fully understand the examples respondents provide in 
their interview, an infantry background is required. 
Third, several interviews will be held with all the modules of a temporary task force. In these 
interviews, the participants will make clear whether the cooperation between the different modules 
went well and which factors contributed or hindered the cooperation between the different  
modules. This qualitative method is used in order to gain a rich insight in the social context of the 
research subject. The different interviews will be semi-structured instead of unstructured in order 
to make it easier to replicate although a qualitative research is always difficult to replicate because 
it is conducted in a certain context (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
4.2. Reliability 
Reliability means that a research can be replicated.  Reliability is secured within this research by 
triangulation. Multiple sources like documents, observations and interview are used. The 
interviews will be held with several participants by using a semi-structured interview protocol. 
This enhances the ability to replicate the research. The respondents also gave their approval of the 
transcriptions of the interviews. Furthermore, a consistent and objective as possible method of 
observation will be used to prevent assumptions that have not been verified. The author is part of 
the organization and has done the coding of the interviews himself. Any defensive mechanisms 
from the respondents were mitigated by the authors outside role in the organization, a shared 
common background and the guarantee that the respondent would be anonymous.   
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4.3. Validity 
Internal validity means that all the argumentation and conclusion are correct and logical. Important 
is that all the connections within the argumentation are right and that important influential factors 
are not neglected. Because this research uses triangulation and member checks, interview-
respondents check whether the information is correct, the internal validity is improved. Another 
important part of this research is the literature review. This literature review ensures that the 
arguments that are being used for measurement are correct. The respondent are all experienced 
marines, that have been abroad and encountered various tense situations. By using the critical 
incidence technique the respondents are able to express which factors are relevant themselves in 
their own words. The respondents are not informed which factors are relevant according to the 
literature. This will increase the chance new factors are identified and reduces the chance that the 
respondent is influenced by knowledge on factors of knowledge transfer.  The respondent analyses 
the situation himself. In the structured part of the interview, the respondent indicates how 
important he finds a certain factor after receiving a small clarification of the factor.  All data used 
in this research comes solely from what the respondent have indicated based on their experience. 
4.4. The Interview 
The interview will make use of the critical incidence technique. This means  that the respondent 
are asked for a positive and negative incident concerning knowledge transfer. They describe the 
incident and point out which factors they think are relevant for the successful or unsuccessful 
transfer of knowledge. This technique provides the possibility for respondent to name new 
unfamiliar factors. The respondents do not get to see the researcher’s factors in advance, so as not 
to be influenced by them. After this unstructured part of the interview, a structured part follows in 
which the respondent is presented with the factors and is able to indicate whether they are relevant. 
This prevents factors that do not come to mind in the first instance are incorrectly neglected. The 
respondent come from all organizational levels within a military task force. From the rank of 
corporal to major. Both various enablers and MAC’s are interviewed. The full list of participants 
and a summary of their interview is included in Appendix D. 
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4.5. The respondents 
The respondent are all mane that come from all ranks within the military task force, ranging in age 
between 24 and 40. All of them were stationed in Doorn at the time they were deployed. The 
interviews were held usually in in their office. Mobile phones were switched off and the door was 
locked to prevent disturbances. The respondents were made clear the interviewer was not there as a 
representative of the organization and that they were participating in a research for a master thesis, 
that would be solely used and analyzed by the author. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes 
and one hour. The interviews combined provided approximately nine hours of audio material.  
Respondent  
ID 
Background 
01 Corporal, Sniper 
02 First Lieutenant, MAC, Fire support enabler 
03 First Lieutenant, MAC 
04 First Lieutenant, MAC, SF 
05 Captain, MAC,  fire support platoon, junior search advisor, forward air controller 
06 Captain, MAC, FST commander 
07 Captain, MAC, FST commander 
08 Sergeant-Major, sniper 
09 Sergeant-Major, mortars, forward observer FST 
10 Sergeant-Major, sniper 
11 Major, MAC, SF 
12 Major, MAC, forward observer, forward air controller 
13 Major, MAC, forward air controller 
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4.7. Coding 
The coding of the transcribed interviews was done by the use of code- or key-words which are 
depicted below. However, the respondent often used a variety of words to describe one of the 
factors without using the keywords. Assigning codes to different quotes is not a matter of black 
and white. It is the judgement of the coder that determines the assignment of codes to the quotes. 
The coding has been done by the author of this research. We recognize that this gives some bias in 
the research. 
Table 3 Factors and their keywords 
Level Factor Keywords 
Societal-
environmental 
factors 
Characteristics of the knowledge 
 
Skills, information, tacit and 
explicit knowledge 
Actional- 
personal factors 
The rational ability of the 
organizational members 
Openness, cleverness 
 The communicative ability of 
the organizational members 
Communicative skills 
 The personal differences 
between the organizational 
members 
Character compatibility 
 Organizational member 
motivation 
Motivation, intrinsic and extrinsic 
Structural-
organizational 
factors 
Divergent objectives Own objectives, Clear goals 
 Prior related knowledge Prior related knowledge, know-
how 
 Division of labor Specialization 
 Organizational anxiety Risk avoidance 
 Hierarchy and status Rank, status 
 Group identity Subcultures 
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5. Findings: which are the most important that factors influence 
knowledge transfer in a temporary military task force? 
Factor Quotes related to 
positive incident 
Quotes related to  
negative incident 
Importance on a 
scale from one to 
five 
Characteristics of the knowledge 0 0 5 for tacit 
knowledge 
The rational ability of the 
organizational members 
16 15 3.72  
The communicative ability of the 
organizational members 
0 2 3.92  
The personal differences between 
the organizational members 
11 6 4 
Organizational member 
motivation 
0 1 2 
Divergent objectives 6 1 4 
Prior related knowledge 12 18 4 
Division of labor 0 1 2 
Organizational anxiety 0 1 2 
Hierarchy and status 1 3 3 
Group identity 1 4 2 
Total 53 50  
Table 4 Findings 
The most inhibiting factors that were related with negative incidents as indicated by Appendix B 
are prior related knowledge, character compatibility, a bounded rationality and cultural 
incompatibility. The most facilitating factors linked to positive incidents according to Appendix B 
are prior related knowledge, character compatibility, clear goals and an open mind set (rational 
ability).  
What is immediately noticeable is that prior related knowledge, as well as character compatibility 
are both an important facilitator as well as inhibiter of knowledge transfer. This means that factors 
can be both facilitators as a inhibiting factor to knowledge transfer. Prior related knowledge for 
example, can be facilitative as stated in the literature and inhibitive, because someone with a lot of 
knowledge might be more rationally bound to the knowledge he/she already owns. This indicates 
that there might be a limit to the amount of knowledge someone may poses, or that people get 
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more rationally bound when they are firmly embedded in a certain mental model. The second thing 
that comes to mind is the relations that has been observed between the different factors that have a 
reciprocate influence on each other. In the last example of prior related knowledge there was an 
indication that it might be a causal factor of a bound rationality. Prior related knowledge is in its 
own way influenced by the division of labor because this determines how the mental model and 
knowledge of the individual develops. The factors are therefore not loose components, but closely 
interrelated. As is shown in the co-occurrence of bounded rationality and prior related knowledge. 
The third thing is that the importance of each factor is tied to a different context and thus varies in 
importance based on the different situations. Each time knowledge needs to be exchanged the 
context will change. For instance, the available time will change, the individuals that need to 
exchange knowledge will change, the urgency of the transfer will vary. This means that factors that 
were particularly relevant in this military context may not be very important in another. 
Nonetheless, prior related knowledge and character compatibility are most common both inhibiting 
and facilitating factor present in this case. Being able to refer to a shared mental model in seems to 
be important in almost all of the cases. Character compatibility is influenced by several factors 
such as: hierarchy, organizational anxiety, bounded rationality and prior related knowledge. As 
soon as knowledge transfer is inhibited character compatibility deteriorates as well.  This makes 
character compatibility more a good indicator for poor knowledge transfer than a cause of poor 
knowledge transfer. This makes prior related knowledge the most important factor that can either 
facilitate or inhibit knowledge transfer. 
Specialization, risk avoidance and subcultures are not very important factors in a temporary 
military task force with a configuration with mainly units from the marines. The pro-active mindset 
and the common background make these factors in this case study less relevant. That does not rule 
out that they could become more relevant in different situation in which units with that do not have 
such a common background. 
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5.1 Which societal-environmental factors are important for knowledge 
transfer in a temporary military task force? 
Characteristics of the knowledge 
Hypothesis 1: The type of knowledge that needs to be transferred determines the medium, the 
effort, the context and the time it takes to acquire certain tacit or explicit knowledge. 
 
The analysis of the results from the unstructured and structured part of the interview as presented 
in Appendix C shows the importance of knowledge in general, both tacit as explicit knowledge, 
with a grade five out of five on importance. Most respondents indicate that both types of 
knowledge are relevant, but tacit knowledge on the subject is needed in order to be effective. The 
type of knowledge has a big  influence on the way knowledge is transferred. Explicit knowledge 
can easily be codified and transferred via books. Tacit knowledge on the other hand has to be 
taught by experience and will take a longer time to transfer. In a temporary military task force tacit 
knowledge is the most important factor that influences knowledge transfer. Hypothesis 1 states 
that time, context and the medium are relevant. This hypothesis is confirmed by the findings. 
 
Respondent 13 (Major, Forward Air Controller) describes it the following way: “Compare it 
with getting your driver’s licence. The Dutch and NATO course are very good and this has 
been acknowledged by the Americans. You learn how to drop a bomb safely and to 
deconflict with other assets. But this doesn’t mean you are a good forward air controller. 
I’ve seen this during my first deployment. I only trained there. Four times a week. Yes, it was 
a quiet deployment. So we started simulating attacks. This way I learned the craft which 
prepared me for my deployment.” 
 
Respondent 13 indicates that tacit knowledge is the most important type of knowledge for his 
profession. As mentioned earlier tacit knowledge is hard to codify. It is hard to share or to 
communicate without having an understanding of the subject. This means that tacit knowledge is 
more difficult to transfer than explicit knowledge because explicit knowledge can be transferred 
across time and space independently (Lam, 2000). The transfer of tacit knowledge requires close 
interaction and a shared understanding. Tacit knowledge must be obtained through practical 
experience in a certain context. This involves a variety of different experiences in a certain context. 
This ‘variety’ and ‘involvement in a certain context’ are crucial factors in obtaining tacit 
knowledge (Nonaka , 1994). The importance of tacit knowledge is also demonstrated by a quote 
from Respondent 6. 
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Respondent 6 (Captain, FST commander): “Before I went there [to Afghanistan], it 
[knowledge] was out of the book. Because you simply do not have the experience, although 
you do have some idea about how the reality in Afghanistan may look like......You try to 
achieve that by reading books. My skill as a FST commander was not fully developed at that 
moment. I didn’t have the experience, only during exercises, not during deployments. During 
the deployments I noticed that the knowledge from the books wasn’t that relevant. The 
experience was much more valuable. For the platoon commander it was 90% about 
experience [tacit knowledge] and the other 10% knowledge on weapons and such [explicit 
knowledge]. That is nice to know but not very relevant at that moment.”. 
This means that enablers possess mainly tacit knowledge which is challenging to transfer. This 
difficulty is also described in several interviews. Respondent 9 describes the problem of 
transferring tacit knowledge when he lacked the time to transfer some very important knowledge. 
Respondent 2 confirms that by stating that giving briefings is not enough, and that it takes context 
to transfer the information. 
Respondent 9 (Sergeant-Major, mortars, forward observer FST):“….That cooperation went 
really well, but in the end nothing happened [no incidents happened during that patrol]. So 
that relation didn’t experience any strain. If something does really happen, in comparison 
with the bad example, I immediately felt something was going terribly wrong. It didn’t feel 
right. If you have to transfer that feeling [tacit knowledge]….That is really hard. It can 
become a struggle.”. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “Yes, that is experience [tacit knowledge]. I notice, 
now I’m an enabler myself, that you can give several briefings to those guys [explicit 
knowledge], I give them myself and I have received briefings from them. Some things they 
do remember, but to really know what you can do and can’t do,[context] you will need the 
enabler. He will advise you on the spot. He has the explicit and tacit knowledge and 
transfers it to you on the spot. You have to experience that on the spot.”  
 
Tacit knowledge takes quite some time to obtain. This means that time is also an important factor 
which is confirmed by Respondent 2. 
 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC):“After the preparation [pre-deployment training] and 
the deployment you are quite skilled with all the different assets. But during the preparation 
and the deployment you are not able to know everything. That is why you have that enabler 
who mustn’t forget it. That doesn’t forget it.”. 
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Available time is a determining factor whether the transfer of knowledge is successful. Tacit 
knowledge also needs to be acquired in a certain context as is confirmed by Respondent 12. 
 
Respondent 12 (Major, MAC): “I would go for tacit knowledge. You have to invest in that. 
Assuming everyone has explicit knowledge. That is an assumption I think you can make. You 
can’t take 100% tacit knowledge to the deployment. You take your experience and 
knowledge of weapon systems. During the deployment you are faced with different rules of 
engagement and you will encounter different situations than in earlier deployments. That 
makes counter-insurgency [stabilization operation] so difficult. The question is whether the 
experience from an earlier counter-insurgency operation is relevant in the counter-
insurgency operation ”. 
5.2 Which actional-personal factors are important for knowledge transfer in a 
temporary military task force? 
Rationality 
Hypotheses 2: Rational ability positively influences knowledge transfer. 
The respondents confirmed both in the unstructured as the structured part of the interview the 
importance of rationality. There are quite some examples of MAC’s that were open for input, 
but also quite some examples of MAC’s that were rationally bound to their own perspectives as 
can be seen in Appendix B. Appendix B indicates that from the 50 quotes that were associated 
with a negative incident 15 were related to a bound rationality. Appendix B also indicates that 
from the 53 positive quotes 16 were related to openness. The MAC’s that were very open are 
often related to positive incidents. MAC’s that were more rationally bound were often 
associated with negative incidents. Quotes that were related to bound rationality co-occurred 
seven out 15 times together with prior related knowledge. This might indicate that there is a 
relation between them. 
The factor rationality was mentioned in almost all of the unstructured part of the interviews, in 
both the negative as the positive incidents. Appendix C show a four out five grade on 
importance. The qualitative examples indicate that if you think in terms of means you will be 
rationally bound. If you think in effects or clear goals, you will be able to match different 
means to a certain effect. This ensures an open mindset and enables the enablers to provide only 
relevant knowledge. However this was not confirmed in the quantitative result. The co-
occurrence of clear goals and openness only happened two out of sixteen times. The hypothesis 
indicated a positive relation between rational ability and knowledge transfer. However the 
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quantitative results show that, apart from being a very important factor, rational ability can 
either be facilitative or inhibitive. Also a relation between clear goals and openness was 
identified from the qualitative study as a relation between prior related knowledge and bound 
rationality. Hypotheses 2 should be changed to: rational ability can both be facilitative and 
inhibit knowledge transfer. 
A positive example is given by a Respondent 3 (First Lieutenant, MAC). 
Respondent 3: “You receive your orders. You analyze them and start looking for the bosses, 
the commanders of the different enablers and you go into a meeting. You ask them: How can 
we complete this assignment? It is parallel planning and combined planning.”. 
Another positive example is given by Respondent 10 (Sergeant-Major, sniper): “He roughly 
explained the assignment and asked the enablers what they could do to complete this 
assignment and he adjusted his plan on that information. This meant for us that we had some 
input in the execution of the plan … this was a pleasant experience.”. 
There are also negative examples as given by Respondent 13 (Major,  forward air 
controller): “If the MAC has not got the knowledge and is not open minded, then the FST is 
not of use to you. If you have someone that is open or has the knowledge and experience 
already, then the cooperation will be very good.”. 
Having clear goals in mind is an important factor for the success of knowledge transfer as can be 
seen in Appendix B. It is mainly associated with the positive incidents.  Respondent 13 formulated 
is the following way. 
Respondent 13 (Major, forward air controller) “He was very clear. Make sure that the effect 
is that the spotters and mortar line are disabled. He didn’t know anything about fire support. 
He was clearly someone who thought in term of effects[clear goals]. He indicated that if we 
could solve the problem he would be able to achieve his effect. That’s the only thing that is 
needed. Eventually F-15’s took  out the spotter positions and mortar line. The mortar fire 
stopped and the convoy could proceed safely. In this case, you had someone who didn’t have 
any knowledge, because isn’t trained in the use of enablers in the army course, but he was 
open and accepted the advice the enablers gave him and he was very clear what effect he 
wanted to achieve and he communicated that effect very well with the enablers. If you 
cooperate with such a mindset, it will be a guarantee for success. Effect based operations 
are the key to success. You can provide all kinds information, but what is it you want to 
achieve[Respondent indicates that when he knows what the MAC wants to achieve he is 
able to make a better assessment of what knowledge he should provide].“ 
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Respondent 13 gave another example of a MAC that was not very clear in what he wanted to 
achieve. 
Respondent 13 (Major, forward air controller): “The MAC wasn’t trained to work with 
enablers. If you don’t have any knowledge, you are able to find out what kind of enablers 
you have in the area of operations and you have to open yourself up to them. He was very 
stubborn and you already see that it would not work. I believe that thinking in effect is 
important[clear goals]. If you don’t think in effects you will go out with you reconnaissance 
platoon with the mindset: we are going to have three great days operating the way we are 
used [prior related knowledge]to, only watching and informing command what we see.”. 
Communicative skills  
Hypotheses 3: Communicative ability positively influences knowledge transfer.  
In the unstructured part of the interviews, communicative skills were only mentioned two times in 
a positive incident as can be seen in Appendix B. However, In Appendix C respondents indicate the 
importance of communicative skills by giving it a four out of five. Hypothesis 3 indicate a positive 
relation between communicative skills and knowledge transfer, which is also confirmed by the 
results from the research. The qualitative results indicate that communicative skills are quite 
important as is shown by the following examples. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “These are very important. An enabler should be 
very communicative. He has to switch. If my MFC’s are stuttering everyone will think: that 
guy doesn’t know what he is doing. He might be the specialist but this badly presented. I 
might not trust him. Presentation is very important to sell your story.”. 
Respondent 11 (Major, MAC): “Those matter always. You have to sell a message. 
Regardless of your background. If you can’t get your story straight that will be a severe 
limitation.”. 
The general conclusion is that communicative skills are always important. 
Personal Differences 
Hypotheses 4: Personal differences between individual members inhibit knowledge transfer. 
Appendix B shows that personal differences or character compatibility is a factor which is very 
common and important. It occurred 17 times of which six quotes were negative and 11 were 
positive. The negative quotes all co-occurred with another factor. There might be a relation 
between personal differences and other factors, or it might become a problem when other factors 
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play a role as well. The respondents give several reasons why tensions may exist between the MAC 
and his enablers i.e. tensions from the past (Respondent 6) or tensions that arise by being in each 
other vicinity for too long (Respondent 12), or cultural differences (Respondent 2). The conclusion 
is that character compatibility/personal differences can be an important inhibitor of facilitator of 
knowledge transfer, but is not always an important factor. It becomes a problem as soon as other 
factor are inhibiting knowledge transfer. Tension starts building and the character incompatibility 
becomes more prominent. Hypothesis 4 indicates an inhibitive relation. The results indicate that 
personal differences were only responsible for six out of 50 quotes were negative. Most of the 
times (11 out of 53) individuals got along well and the character compatibility even facilitated 
knowledge transfer. Hypotheses 4 should be split up.  
Hypotheses 4a: Personal differences can be an inhibiter of knowledge transfer and usually co-
occurs with other factors. 
Hypotheses 4b: Character compatibility can be a facilitator for knowledge transfer. 
The following quotes illustrate the importance of character compatibility. 
Respondent 6 (Captain, FST commander): “Then you will see that… for me it is important 
that you respect each other. You don’t need to hug and you don’t have to be best friends, as 
long as you respect each other. It is important to respect his professionalism and you should 
always have in mind what matters most. Then the cooperation will go well.” 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “We had several tense moments, but because there 
was a personal click, this went fairly easy.” 
What is even more interesting is the fact that Appendix B shows that this factor rarely occurs 
alone. This might suggest that personal differences may be inhibiting when other inhibiting factors 
frustrate the personal relation between the members. The factor occurs in combination with many 
other factors i.e. the quote from respondent 4, 5 and 6 that combine prior related knowledge with 
personal differences. 
Respondent 4 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “The relationship is a bit of common background. 
Which helps from day one. At a certain point you are configured to each other.”    
Respondent 5 (Captain,  fire support platoon): “Towards the end of the mission, it improved. 
It was about getting to know each other. When they knew what I wanted, they managed to 
keep that up for a while.” 
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Respondent 6 (Captain, FST commander): “ That was not optimal, that was not optimal 
after the incident either. This has to do with several reasons which I won’t explain. But there 
was friction between him and me. But also between my forward air controller and him. They 
had been in the same POTOM… and if you’re speaking about trust and respect… well I did 
not have that for him. He might have had it for me, but I did not have any confidence in his 
capabilities. That was hard, that was an issue, but I think that most of all the inexperience 
with our role was an issue.”  
There is also an example of a combination with group identity by Respondent 2. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “If I compare that with the experience I had with the 
marine assault engineers, those were all marines that I knew from mountain- and winter- 
exercises. You know them personally, but there was also a  feeling that we were all marines. 
That is a much easier mentality to work with.” 
There is also one example that indicates that personal differences are not always present. 
Respondent 7 (Captain, FST commander): “The personal relation…. No, certainly not in an 
international context…. You don’t experience that very often. Then it is more what can I do 
for you and what can you do for me?” 
Motivation 
Hypotheses 5a: Extrinsic motivation facilitates the sharing of explicit knowledge. 
Hypotheses 5b: Intrinsic motivation facilitates the sharing of tacit knowledge. 
All respondents indicated that they were intrinsically motivated during the interviews. It seems 
that motivation is required on both sides of the knowledge transfer process. This corresponds with 
the view on the transfer of tacit knowledge which takes time and must be experienced in a certain 
context to obtain, but also requires motivation, both as knowledge sender and knowledge receiver. 
Respondents indicated in Appendix C that intrinsic motivation was the most relevant factor to 
them. In relation to the statement from characteristics of the knowledge that most knowledge that is 
being used by marines is tacit, Hypotheses 5b is confirmed. Due to the lack on data on explicit 
knowledge in this research, no statement will be made on the evaluation of Hypotheses 5a. 
Respondent 3 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “I’ve seen only intrinsic motivation during 
deployments. You don’t become a marine or soldier for nothing. I haven’t seen people that 
go to Afghanistan because it pays so well.”. 
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Respondent 5(Captain,  fire support platoon): “and when someone pushes the button they 
are very keen to show everybody who they are. The same is true for the snipers. That are 
guys you don’t have to motivate. They do that nine out ten times themselves. That is a nice 
cooperation. They are able to tell their story quite enthusiastically and are able to convince 
people that way.”. 
When asked about the importance of motivation respondents indicate that it is important and that it 
works both ways. Respondent 2 says the following. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “Yes, you have to have an interest for it. If you don’t 
want to know it, there will be no one that will tell you that you have to know it. When I look 
at myself and my colleagues , we all saw the necessity to know what everyone is doing, 
however, at a certain point you get overfed with knowledge. Then you’re tired, and you will 
not go to the enablers to ask him what it is he exactly does. The interest should also be 
drawn by the enablers themselves. They should involve you. That is his responsibility.”. 
Respondent 5(Captain,  fire support platoon) confirms this view and states: “It’s intrinsic, 
because they are specialists. They are marines, but they have chosen to specialize. Those 
guys are proud to do what they do and are keen on letting others know what they are 
capable of.”. 
Only one case of extrinsic motivation was described by Respondent 12:  
Respondent 12 (Major, MAC): “Marines, in general, have a passion for their work. That is 
good. We had a sergeant of the mortars that had specialized only several week before 
deployment, which had only limited experience with the mortars. He said, literarily, that he 
did it for the money. If you are really in for the money you won’t make it, but I would like to 
describe him as an exception.”. 
47 
 
 
Figure 7 Transfer of mainly tacit knowledge 
 
5.3 Which structural-organizational factors are important for knowledge 
transfer in a temporary military task force? 
Divergent objectives 
Hypotheses 6: Clear goals facilitate knowledge sharing.  
The use of clear goals is very important. According to Appendix B the use of clear goals leads to 
better knowledge transfer, but it is only responsible for six of the 53 postive quotes. There is one 
case of divergent objectives which is indeed inhibitive. This means that Hypothesis 6 is supported, 
but should be complemented with Hypotheses 6b: Divergent objectives may be inhibitive to 
knowledge transfer. The use of objectives can be inhibitive when they are not clear and facilitative 
when they are not. Respondent 2, 6 and 13 provide examples. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “I put out the guidelines and everybody 
understands. You have to spend more time planning. Everybody moves in that direction. The 
end state has become much more important. I do not have negative experiences with 
enablers because we had an open planning.”. 
Respondent 6 (Captain, FST commander):“That we both knew what was important, where 
the priority lay, and the priority was with the unit. We had three casualties, but it was also 
important to get the rest of the unit back to base, because this was also important for the 
mission.”. 
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Respondent 13 (Major, forward air controller):”He was very clear: make sure that the effect 
on the battlefield is that the spotters and mortar line. He did not have any prior related 
knowledge on fire support. He was someone who clearly thought in effects.”. 
Thinking in objectives and goals makes it for the enabler easier to know which knowledge he 
should provide. If enablers are maintaining their own objectives, they may provide different or 
inconsistent knowledge as Respondent 2 indicates. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “You have to, you cannot know everything yourself 
as a lieutenant. After a preparation period and a deployment, you reasonably well know how 
to use the enablers. But during the preparation and the first month of the deployment you 
will not…. And you do not need to know everything. You are allowed to forget things. That is 
why you have the enabler. He won’t forget it. The only disadvantage is that some enablers 
have different objectives. This provides friction.”. 
Prior related knowledge 
Hypothesis 7: Prior related knowledge facilitates knowledge transfer.  
Both Appendix B and C confirm the importance of prior related knowledge. It is responsible for 
11 of the 53 positive quotes and 18 out of 50 negative quotes. This makes prior related 
knowledge the most important factor, that can be both a facilitator as an inhibitor. This is 
confirmed by both MAC’s and enablers. This means that Hypothesis 7 is not supported in the sense 
that prior related knowledge can also be inhibitive. Hypothesis 7 should be: Prior related 
knowledge can be both inhibitive as facilitative.  
Respondent 4 (MAC) indicates.  
Respondent 4 (First Lieutenant, MAC):“It makes a difference if you already have some idea 
what the Panzerhouwitzer or different types of planes and helicopters are. That is a great 
help.”. 
Respondent 5(Captain, fire support platoon) confirms that: “Yes, I think it works that way. I 
can see it out of my own experience. I’ve been a forward air controller and I got placed with 
the fire support platoon. You can obtain knowledge more easily. If you’ve already been on 
an exercise with the army engineers and you encounter them again on a deployment, then 
the knowledge transfer goes much easier because you adapt your communicative skills to 
them. The same applies to platoon commanders that I have supported. The cooperation with 
someone with more experience was much easier than with a young inexperienced lieutenant. 
Not that he wasn’t motivated, but the picture still had to be filled in.” 
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A common background or a shared mental model creates a mutual prior related knowledge that 
enhances knowledge transfer. If an enabler has been a MAC as well, it is much easier for him to 
relate his knowledge to the MAC’s framework as Respondent 7 confirms. 
Respondent 7 (Captain, FST commander): “That is one of the most important factors for the 
success of the marine FST. Almost every FST commander has been a MAC as well. You 
know what an infantry unit is capable of and what they do. This is a great help when you 
want to inform the MAC of what you are capable of and how you can support him. That 
would be different if you only have technical knowledge on the assets that you provide and 
you don’t have any experience from the ‘other side’.” 
The mental model can also inhibit knowledge transfer. If you don’t have a shared mental model it 
is hard to relate to each other’s mental model and exchange knowledge. Respondent 5 gives an 
example. 
Respondent 5 (Captain,  fire support platoon): “When you are longer in the service you tend 
to get stuck in fixed patterns. You see that quite often with company commanders, who are 
ten years older than we are, that when they have to work with enablers they don’t know and 
they don’t know what to do with them. So it is not only on the platoon level. I think it is even 
more apparent at the company level. Because platoon commanders are, in general, young 
guys. They aren’t stuck in fixed patterns. They have completed the platoon commanders 
course but they are still open minded and like to work efficiently.” 
Respondent 13 (Major, forward air controller) confirms this view: “It contributes to the 
success of the MAC and the enabler. For someone that has experienced…. if your world 
exists out 30 to 40 marines that are on the attack, that is ok, but that isn’t how the world 
works. You have to see it.” 
Having a shared mental model between the MAC and enabler thus enhances the mutual prior 
related knowledge. If there is a discrepancy between the mental model of the enabler and the 
model of the MAC it might even slow the transfer of knowledge if there is a big difference. 
Another example of the inhibiting capability of a different mental model is given by Respondent 
11. 
Respondent 11 (Major, MAC ):“This is about the army engineers. They do their searching 
and they don’t want to do that at night. He is able to do it, because he has night vision, but 
he doesn’t prefer it. I can understand that, because he can’t see depth with night vision, 
which is important when searching for IED’s. But if I want to continue at night, he will think 
that it is unacceptable, because he is convinced that working at night is unacceptable. But 
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that is unacceptable for me, because the tactical situation is unacceptable. Then you get a 
certain tension. In the end, the one with the highest rank wins. But it creates a situation of 
mutual misunderstanding. In his framework it is unacceptable to search at night and I try to 
explain why, but he won’t see it.” 
This inhibiting characteristic of prior related knowledge becomes most apparent in the 
cooperation between enablers that did not originate from the marine infantry.  
Respondent 4 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “My experience with the army enablers was much 
stiffer. We wanted the same. We briefed the same, that was clear. I posed confirmatory 
question. But when we were in the area, in my opinion, they let me down…that was a whole 
different way of cooperating. By the end of the deployment, it improved. It was all about 
learning to work together. When they found out how I wanted things, they managed to do 
that for a while.” 
This quote and several others confirm the advantage of having a shared mental model, a common 
background. Both situations are depicted in the figure below. 
 
Figure 8 Differing frameworks (proposed model) 
 
Division of labor 
Hypothesis 8: A strong division of labor is negatively related to the transfer of knowledge. 
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Specialization does not seem to play important role in the transfer of knowledge as can be seen in 
both Appendix B and C. In Appendix C it only has a 2,3 out of five on importance. This might be 
due to the common background most marines share. So Hypothesis 8 cannot be confirmed but also 
cannot be dismissed. Respondent 2 provides a possible explanation. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC): “You had to have a medic with you on patrol. We 
had a woman from the fleet. I had one who only once made a big journey and had spent the 
rest of her time in the sickbay. She had been her own boss.  She knew a week in advance 
whether a shift had changed. She was not used to the infantry mindset……She couldn’t deal 
with the uncertainty. Her whole frame of reference was different…… If you look at our 
enablers, they have all completed the marine course. It might be a bit rusty, but the basis 
and the mindset are still there nonetheless.” 
Respondent 4 (First Lieutenant, MAC) complements this: “In the marine corps, everybody 
is first a marine and second his specialization. That is something the corps excels in.” 
Organizational anxiety 
Hypothesis 9: Organizational anxiety inhibits knowledge transfer.  
Appendix B and C indicate that risk avoidance only plays a minor role in the transfer of 
knowledge. There has been no indication of an organizational blame culture. However, risk 
avoidance always plays a role in the transfer of knowledge. There is only one quote related to a 
negative incident in Appendix B and in Appendix C, respondents give it a two out of five on 
importance. However, the negative quote confirms Hypothesis 9, although it only plays a minor 
role. 
Respondent 9 (Sergeant-Major, mortars, forward observer FST) indicates: “You are as good as 
your last performance. That is how it works. However, the mindset is that it is better to make a 
decision and worry about whether it was the right one afterwards.” 
Respondent 7 (Captain, FST commander) confirms that: “No, General Cammaert had a 
good saying: It is better to be punished for doing something wrong, than to be punished for 
doing nothing at all. I share his opinion that it is better to answer for your mistakes than that 
you cannot explain why you did nothing.” 
Risk avoidance apparently is not an organizational factor, because taking risks is part of the job. 
However, risk avoidance does play a role according to some respondents.  
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Respondent 13 (Major, forward air controller): “I can imagine that if you don’t have any 
relevant knowledge on aerial bombardment and you are in contact with the enemy and you 
get the advice to drop that you might be reluctant to heed that advice. That is the trust you 
have to have….. It takes guts to walk on paths that no one has ever tread before. You have to 
be very clear in the effect you want to achieve.” 
This respondents indicates that risk avoidance is tied to fear of the unknown. 
Respondent 2 has another factor that affects risk avoidance. 
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC):“I think risk avoidance certainly plays a role at 
certain levels. Every time I wanted to do a live firing run with mortar fire controllers, there 
always was a reason why the company commander was absent. Because then they have to 
do it themselves…… this involves some risk avoiding behavior…..I think risk avoidance 
plays a role. Especially at the company level and higher up. Although they will never 
acknowledge it.” 
Hierarchy and status 
Hypotheses 10a: A lack of status  inhibits the transfer of knowledge. 
Hypotheses 10b: A lower position within the organization inhibits the transfer of knowledge 
Hierarchy and status are not very important factors according to Appendix B and C. It only scores 
a three out of five on importance in Appendix C And is only mentioned three times in a negative 
incident in Appendix B. This confirms the Hypothesis10a and b, but they are not very important 
factors. On the one hand, hierarchy influences the acceptance of certain knowledge as is 
demonstrated by Respondent  10. 
Respondent 10 (Sergeant-Major, sniper): “People are sensitive for hierarchy. What is very 
important that you have good arguments based on facts and the truth. I think it would be a 
limitation if someone judges information by the rank of its supplier. It does happen. If I say 
something, and I’m a sergeant-major, and if the colonel would say the same it has a better 
opportunity to be accepted. That is hard at times, but that is the structure in which we work 
and we have to be aware of that.” 
Most respondents indicate that hierarchy does not influence them, but they can imagine it being a 
factor of influence. 
On the other hand, hierarchy is an important tool and allows the MAC to formulate goals that 
enhance the transfer of knowledge as is explained by Respondent 11. 
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Respondent 11 (Major, MAC): “As a boss you have to know what you want on the long 
and short term.” 
Respondent 12 complements. 
Respondent 12 (Major, MAC): “Of course it is important. That has a reason within the 
armed forces. It is not for nothing that this system exists for over 3000 years. You see it with 
the enablers and a certain understanding or misunderstanding that exists. In the end, the 
question is: who is the owner of the company plan? It is of the company commander 
regardless of how many effort he has put in to it. He has the last call. As an enabler you may 
give advice but the commander has the decisions.” 
Hierarchy is a tool which enables the MAC the formulate goals to which the enabler can adjust 
the knowledge he would like to transfer on. 
Group identity 
Hypothesis 11: Strong professional identities inhibit knowledge transfer.  
Appendix B and C indicate that subcultures only play a minor role in the transfer of knowledge 
with only four negative quotes and a rating of two out of five on importance. However, Hypothesis 
11 is confirmed although it is of minor importance in this research. This is confirmed by most 
respondents.  
Respondent 2 (First Lieutenant, MAC) explains: “All of our men have done the marine 
course. It might be a bit rusty in some cases, but the mindset is still there.” 
Most respondents indicated the same. The only example in which the subculture might be an 
inhibiting factor is with the special forces. Respondent 2, 4 and 11 confirm this.  
Respondent 11 (Major, MAC, SF): “By those guys it is a little bit stronger. Where does this 
come from? These guys did the marine course and were at that time above average. They 
were noticed and they were offered to go into a certain direction. They complete a special 
course and are considered special. They get special equipment and it is all special. At a 
certain point you start acting special. Then you get prima donna behavior. You see the same 
with students.”  
The special forces are a special brand within the marine corps and the respondents indicate 
that knowledge transfer might be inhibited by their special status.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Characteristics of the 
knowledge 
 
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed by the findings. 
The rational ability of the 
organizational members 
Hypothesis 2 should be changed to: Rational ability can 
both be facilitative as inhibitive for knowledge transfer. 
The communicative ability of 
the organizational members 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by the findings 
 
The personal differences 
between the organizational 
members 
Hypothesis 4 should be split up.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Personal differences can be an inhibiter of 
knowledge transfer and usually co-occurs with other factors. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Character compatibility can be a facilitator for 
knowledge transfer. 
Organizational member 
motivation 
Hypothesis 5b is confirmed. Due to the lack on data on explicit 
knowledge in this research, no statement will be made on the 
relevance of Hypothesis 5a. 
Divergent objectives 
 
Hypothesis 6 is supported, but should be complemented with 
Hypothesis 6b: Divergent objectives may be inhibitive to 
knowledge transfer. 
Prior related knowledge 
 
Hypothesis 7 needs to be changed to: Prior related knowledge 
can be both inhibitive as well as facilitative.  
 
Division of labor 
 
Hypothesis 8 cannot be confirmed but also cannot be 
dismissed. 
Organizational anxiety 
 
Hypothesis 9 is confirmed by the findings. 
Hierarchy and status 
 
Hypotheses 10a and b are confirmed. 
 
Group identity 
 
Hypothesis 11 is confirmed. 
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Which individual, organizational and environmental factors influence knowledge transfer in a 
temporary military task force? There are five conclusions that can be made from this study. 
1. All factors are relevant. 
2. Some factors are more relevant in the military context than others. 
3. Some factors can be both facilitating as inhibitive. 
4. Most factors are related and influence each other. 
5. The relevance of a certain factor varies per situation or context. 
1.This research has extracted several factors from scientific literature and these were confirmed 
during the interviews held with marines that have served Afghanistan. The initial factors extracted 
from the literature have not changed. The influence of the factors on knowledge transfer has been 
confirmed, but the relevance of certain factors varied in the military context.  
2.The most inhibiting factors that were related with negative incidents as indicated by Appendix B 
are prior related knowledge, character compatibility, a bounded rationality and cultural 
incompatibility. The most facilitating factors linked to positive incidents according to Appendix B 
are prior related knowledge, character compatibility, clear goals and an open mind set (rational 
ability).  
3. This means that factors can be both facilitators as a inhibiting factor to knowledge transfer. Prior 
related knowledge for example, can be facilitative as stated in the literature and inhibitive, because 
someone with a lot of knowledge might be more rationally bound to the knowledge he/she already 
owns.  
4. The relations that have been observed between the different factors indicate that they are 
reciprocate to each other. There is an indication that prior related knowledge has a strong relation 
with bounded rationality. Prior related knowledge itself is influenced by the division of labor, 
because this determines how the mental model and knowledge of the individual develops. The 
factors are therefore not lose components, but closely interrelated, a shown in the co-occurrence of 
bounded rationality and prior related knowledge.  
5. Each factor is tied to a different context and thus varies in importance based on the different 
situations. Each time knowledge needs to be exchanged the context will change. For instance, the 
available time will change, the individuals that need to exchange knowledge will change, the 
urgency of the transfer will vary. This means that factors that were particularly relevant in this 
military context may not be very important in another. 
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In the military context time, context, and necessity are extra important as well. Time and context 
proved very important due to the tacit nature of the knowledge that was employed, and the short 
notice in which split second decision have to be made. Necessity is related to objectives. During 
military operations the price of failure may be very high, so a certain necessity is embedded within 
in the military that strengthens the commitment to certain goals. This makes divergent objectives 
not very common, and explains the low number of divergent objectives in Appendix B. 
The factors that are relevant vary per situation. In a training environment like the marine officers 
course (POTOM), or the marine course (EVO) tacit knowledge needs to get from the organization 
to the student. In this case, the normal factors that influence the transfer of tacit knowledge are 
relevant.  
 
Figure 9 proposed model for knowledge transfer during peace time 
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When the MAC is on deployment and he needs to obtain knowledge from the enabler, the factor of 
time is much more limited and the amount of knowledge that needs to be obtained increases. Now 
other factors are gaining importance. The picture below shows a marine enabler with the infantry 
framework, Framework A, and his own extra specialisation, Framework B. With limited time 
available other factors gain importance. The enabler needs to limit his amount of transferable 
knowledge to only achieve the goals. He has to sell his knowledge to the MAC, so communicative 
skills are important as well. If the MAC already has some understanding of the enabler´s 
specialization it will increase his prior related knowledge. Enablers with a higher status or position 
in the hierarchy are more likely to successfully transfer his knowledge. Especially when an enabler 
has a necessary capability that is vital for the success of the operation.  
 
 
Figure 10 proposed model for knowledge transfer on deployment from marine to marine  
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When the enabler is from another branch of the armed forces other factors gain importance as well. 
The more specialised the enablers is, the more the division of labour plays a role. An engineer from 
the air manouevre brigade will have a more similar framework with a MAC from the marines than 
with a regular engineer. Marines share a common marine identity. Enablers from other branches 
have a diffent cultural background which might inhibit knowledge transfer. The more uncertainties, 
or inhibiting factors there are, the more risk avoidance will play a role in the knowledge transfer 
process.  
 
 
Figure 11 proposed model for knowledge transfer from army enabler to marine 
 
These examples show that all the factors are of some importance but their occurrence varies 
depending on the situation. quantative study.  
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Discussion 
The of this research was to identify which factors influence knowledge transfer between the 
individual and the team in a military task force. The results show that all of the factors were indeed 
present, but some were more important than other in the military context. However, by focussing 
on both facilitative as inhibitive factors, unlike the other articles that focussed solely on the 
inhibitive side of several factors, the third conclusion is that factors can be both facilitative as 
inhibitive (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Schilling & Kluge, 2009; Yih-Tong Sun & Scott, 
2005).  Some factors like specialisation and prior related knowledge might be more like a balance. 
Specialization means that you get good at a certain process, but you neglect other knowledge 
structures and thereby limit your prior related knowledge on other subjects. But it does not help to 
only generalize in order to build a broad prior related knowledge structure without specialising 
because specialization has its advantages as well. This means that these factors are more the ends 
of the balance between specializing and generalizing. 
This research presented the philosophical discussion that exists between rationalist and empirics. 
Two different types of definitions of knowledge were presented. One that focussed on the practical 
applicable side of knowledge i.e. the ability to perform a certain task. The other definition focussed 
on knowledge as being subjective. The fifth conclusion that the relevance of a factor varies per 
situation or context the notion that knowledge is embedded in a certain context or framework.  The 
definition this research chose combined the practical applicability of the first definition as well as 
the focus on context from the second definition. The outcome of this research that confirms the 
importance of context, strengthens the position of constructivists like Polanyi(1962) that focus on 
the importance of context. Because context is so important it might even be better to not only 
organise the factors by organizational level but also by organization type. The organizational 
models by Mintzberg (1979) can provide a framework to which the different factors may be 
modelled by context. 
The fourth conclusion is that factors are interdependent of each other. This relation between the 
factors indicates that there can be no distinction between sources and factors  like Yih-Tong Sun 
and Scott (2005) propose. You can only speak of factors that directly influence knowledge transfer 
and that indirectly knowledge transfer since indirect factors can, in some cases, be direct factors as 
well and vice versa.  
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Recommendations  
The recommendations are based on the conclusion and the discussion. They will be split in 
academic recommendations that include suggestions for future research and more practical 
recommendations concerning the case study organization. 
Academic Recommendations 
This research makes three suggestions for further research emphasizing 1) a more fine grained 
definition of the different factors, 2) their occurrence in different scenarios and situations, and 3) 
the relations between the different factors. 
As mentioned in the discussion, the conceptual definitions of some of the previously identified 
factors are still too vague and broad, making it difficult to generalize between studies. Future 
research should focus on providing better conceptualizations and the development of measurement 
instruments that can assess these factors. This would enhance the extent to which research on 
organizational learning in general and research on knowledge transfer in specific, could be 
applicable to different cases and would make it easier to generalize outcomes from different 
studies. So more fine grained definitions of factors that influence knowledge transfer would 
provide future researcher with building blocks that would enable them to create more extensive 
research. 
This research has provided some insight into the factors that influence the transfer of knowledge 
within a temporary military task force. More research using mixed methods, both qualitative as 
quantitative, would combine the best of two worlds and might provide with new insights about 
knowledge transfer. Further research should focus on the occurrence of the different factors in 
different situations in the same case-organization and on the occurrence of the different factors in 
different branches in both the public and private sector. Testing the occurrence of different factors 
in different situations would provide an insight whether factors are bound to a certain organization 
or to a certain situation. 
The final recommendation for further research is the investigation of the relations between the 
factors that influence knowledge transfer. This research has shown that in different situations the 
relevance or occurrence of factors is influences other factors. The factors are clearly related. An 
example from this research i.e. is the relation between the factor time and a factor as clear goals. 
When time is not available, priorities must be given by setting clear goals. This will limit the 
amount of knowledge that needs to be transferred and will enhance the receivers motivation to 
obtain the knowledge because it is related to essential goals. When the knowledge sender lacks the 
communicative skills to convince the receiver of its relevance and . The receiver will spend his 
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scarce time on others that are more capable of “promoting” their knowledge.  A possible model of 
the interrelations is depicted below. This picture is not complete. If all relations were depicted the 
model would be far more complex. This was not the goal of this research so a full model of the 
interrelations between the different factors cannot be given based on this research. As stated in the 
discussion it is possible to make these models based the different organizational models by 
Mintzberg (1979). 
 
Figure 12 Relations between factors (proposed model) 
Practical implications 
There are several practical implications regarding the MAC’s mental model and modus operandi. 
The most inhibiting factors enablers faced, when transferring knowledge to the MAC was he 
lacked prior related knowledge and was rationally bound to his own knowledge structure. MACs 
should be trained more in the use of different enablers. He is now to specialised in the infantry 
metier. Integrating a wide range of different exercises using a variety of different enablers in 
different enablers would provide the MAC with a broad structure of prior related knowledge. This 
has two advantages. The first advantage is that he will be able to quickly obtain knowledge from an 
enabler. The second advantage is that it will give him an open mindset to other specializations. 
It is not only the MAC who needs to complement his mental model to be effective. The unit as a 
whole needs a shared mental model or modus operandi in order to be effective. This means that the 
unit needs to be together for a longer period than usual six months of preparation. This research 
proposes to create ready to go combat or strike groups that have spent considerable time together 
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and includes all the necessary enablers in advance. The increasingly complex environment may be 
very unforgiving to teams that are not fully integrated. 
Limitations 
Research into social phenomena is quite complicated because variables or factors are hard to 
define. In contrast to research in physics, the variables for research on social phenomena are 
complex and difficult to pin down (Bryman & Bell, 2011). This provides some problems for the 
replicability of the research. Several studies into knowledge transfer have been conducted, but 
some use different factors and when the same factors are used, researchers might have a different 
interpretation of what they mean. Even when researchers would use the same definitions the 
interpretation of the researcher himself still plays a role. Most studies on organizational learning in 
general rely heavily on quantitative research methods (Yukl, 2009). The critique on this research 
method is that it does not capture the complexity of behavior (Yukl, 2009). This research has used 
a mixed research method in order to produce some quantitative data without losing sight on the 
complexity of the researchsubject. This research is thus an exploration in the application in 
different research methods.  
As indicated in the chapter methodology, the researcher has been a member of the organization in 
which this research has taken place. This has had advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is 
that the researches already had some profound understanding of the complex relations that exists in 
the military. The disadvantage is that the researcher, despite his drive to objectivity, is subject to an 
inherent bias. The research object is also prone to bias. An example is the limited appreciation for 
the factor motivation in proces of knowledge transfer in the qualitative part of the study. A possible 
explanation is that most marines are very intrinsically motivated. When confronted with the factor 
motivation in the quantitatvie part of the research. The respondent ackknowledged the importance 
of motivation. The combination of both a qualitative and quantitative research method has paid off. 
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Appendix A: Interview protocol 
Goal of the interview 
The goal of the interview is to collect information on factors that facilitate or inhibit level of 
knowledge transfer.  
Result of the interview 
The interview will provide information on which facilitating or inhibiting factor the respondent 
finds most important and relevant. 
Method for the interview 
All the respondents get a request for the interview with some small details on the subject. This 
request states that the research aims to research how the knowledge transfer went between the 
platoons and the different specialist sub-units and why this cooperation went so well or was less 
successful. 
The interview itself consists out of four parts:  
a. First the interviewer and respondent get acquainted. The interviewer makes sure that the 
location does not provide any problems for the recordings and that the interview cannot be 
interrupted unnecessarily. After that, the interviewer informs the respondent on the subject. 
This is the same information which was also included in the interview request. 
b. The second part of the interview will be unstructured. The respondent is free to describe 
the cooperation and which factors he thinks are the most important. 
c. The third part of the interview will be semi-structured in which topics that have not been 
mentioned by the respondent will be discussed. 
d.  The end of the interview. The interviewer checks whether all the topics have been 
discussed. 
 
All interviews will be recorded on an audio recorder and the interviewer has the possibility to make 
notes during the interview. The interview will be written out and the results will be translated in the 
research. 
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The interview 
Introduction 
Topics to discuss beforehand : 
- Background of the interview, check whether the information send in the request is obtained 
and whether the respondent understands the context of the interview. 
- Explain how the interview will unfold  
- Way of reporting.  
- Attend respondent on the audio recording device and check permission.  
 
Unstructured part 
Did the knowledge transfer between the specialised sub-units and the regular infantry platoon 
go well?  
-Which factors contributed to this development? 
-Which factors contributed to the an opposite development?  
 
Semi-structured part 
How did other factors hinder or facilitate the transfer of knowledge? 
Topics that have not been covered during the unstructured interview will briefly be covered to 
confirm their possible irrelevance or relevance. 
Checklist different topics 
Level Factor Keywords 
Societal-
environmental 
factors 
Characteristics of the knowledge 
 
Skills, information, tacit and 
explicit knowledge 
Actional- 
personal factors 
The rational ability of the 
organizational members 
 
Openness, cleverness 
 The communicative ability of 
the organizational members 
Communicative skills 
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 The personal differences 
between the organizational 
members 
 
Character compatibility 
 Organizational member 
motivation 
 
Motivation, intrinsic and 
extrinsic 
Structural-
organizational 
factors 
Divergent objectives 
 
Own objectives 
 Prior related knowledge 
 
Prior related knowledge, know-
how 
 Division of labor 
 
Specialization 
 Organizational anxiety 
 
Risk avoidance 
 Hierarchy and status 
 
Rank, status 
 Group identity 
 
Subcultures 
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Appendix B: Unstructured results 
 
 
This table show the co-occurrence of the different factors mentioned by the respondents in the 
unstructured part of the interview in which they describe which factor for knowledge transfer have 
been important to them. All factors are linked to a negative or positive incident. The column 
negative and positive show which factors are represented in respectively the positive and negative 
incidents. Most important factors in this table are the absorptive capacity or prior related 
knowledge, character compatibility, communicative skills an rationality. 
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Appendix C: Structured results 
 
 
This table shows the results from the structured part of the interview. It indicates how relevant the 
different factors are for the respondent. There sometimes was some disagreement on the relevance 
of a certain factor. This explains the big differences between the min and the max.  
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Appendix D: Respondent summary 
ID Background Summary factor 
01 Corporal, 
Sniper 
The positive incident is about an operation led by a MAC that did his planning with all his enablers. He was 
open to suggestions from his enablers and was motivated to put some effort to get to know his enablers 
better. Motivation and openness are the two most important factors for successful knowledge transfer in this 
example.  
Positive: 
Openness and 
motivation 
  The negative incident is about a troops in contact (TIC) situation with a different MAC. He was open as 
well to suggestions to during the planning of the operations. But when confronted with opposing military 
forces he seems to forget all about his enablers. The respondent suspect this the result that the use of 
enablers is not embedded in his mental model and that under stress the MAC falls back to his infantry 
mental model and limits himself in the use of the capabilities provided by his enablers. The use of enablers 
is not engrained in his mental model and under stress he is not able to use them effectively. The important 
factor for unsuccessful knowledge transfer is that the knowledge apparently takes effort to engrain in the 
shared mental model. 
Negative:  
Prior related 
knowledge, tacit 
knowledge  
02 First 
Lieutenant, 
MAC, Fire 
support 
enabler 
The positive incident is about operations conducted with assault engineers from the marines over an 
extended period. The respondent describes the positive character compatibility and the cultural 
compatibility. He emphasizes the need to be open for suggestions of enablers during the planning phase of 
an operation and the need to set a clear goal so everyone can question himself how he can contribute in the 
achievement of that goal.  
Positive: 
Character 
compatibility, 
openness, cultural 
compatibility, 
clear goals 
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  The negative incident is about operations conducted during the preparation prior for the deployment to 
Afghanistan with engineers from the army. The respondent indicated that there was a cultural difference and 
the characters were not compatible and he did considerable effort to improve his relationship, but it just 
would not work. 
Negative: 
Cultural 
compatibility and 
character 
compatibility 
03 First 
Lieutenant, 
MAC 
The positive incident is about a relieve in place operation with 126 man personnel. The MAC did a planning 
with all the enablers and the operation went smoothly. The respondent indicated that being open for the 
suggestions of others is very important and constant communication prior during and after the operation 
improves knowledge transfer. 
Positive:  
Openness  
  The negative incident is about a reconnaissance patrol with a FST from the army. The MAC was not aware 
of some limitations of the army FST and this severely hindered the operation and the FST was familiar with 
the marine modus operandi. The respondent indicated that this was due to a mutual lack of common 
background.  
Negative: Prior 
related knowledge 
and tacit 
knowledge. 
04 First 
Lieutenant, 
MAC, SF 
The positive incident is about the cooperation with the Vikings. The MAC did not have much experience 
with working with vehicles. He took quite some time to familiarize himself with the Vikings in order to 
build a modus operandi. He also took some time to get to know the crew in order to get a character 
compatibility. The respondent indicated that the common background is an important factor. 
Positive: Prior 
related 
knowledge, tacit 
knowledge, 
character 
compatibility, 
common 
background 
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The negative incident is about the cooperation with army enablers. The lack of common background and 
difference in modus operandi created friction. The enablers lacked discipline in guard routines, physical 
fitness to endure the patrols. Eventually army engineers started giving him inconsistent advice out of 
personal motivation instead of professional motivation. This deteriorated the trust and the transfer of 
knowledge. 
Negative: lack of 
common 
background, lack 
of motivation, 
lack of trust. 
05 Captain, 
MAC,  fire 
support 
platoon, 
junior 
search 
advisor 
(assault 
engineers) 
and forward 
air 
controller 
The positive incident is about an operation to search an Afghan village. It involves the cooperation between 
an infantry unit and a sniper section. The MAC is unable to conduct the operation on his own. The necessity 
for extra manpower made him look at the extra capabilities enablers can provide. The respondent provided 
him with information on the capabilities of snipers and they were utilized effectively.  
Positive: 
Necessity to use 
extra capabilities 
and openness. 
  The negative incident is about a patrol that encountered an IED. The respondent as expert on IED gave a 
certain advice to the MAC based on his expertise. He was then overruled by someone higher in rank that did 
not accept his advice. The respondent suspects that this is related to the experience of the other. That by 
having already quite some experience limits the openness to new ideas and that inexperienced MAC’s are 
more prone to new ideas.  
Negative: Limited 
prior related 
knowledge, bound 
rationality and 
hierarchy. 
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06 Captain, 
MAC, FST 
commander 
The positive incident is about a satellite patrol that was struck by an improvised explosive device which 
made some casualties. The evacuation of the wounded went smoothly because the MAC and the FST had a 
shared modus operandi. The respondent indicated he got along well with the MAC and there was mutual 
trust between them. The priorities/goals were clear in this operation. The respondents  indicates that trust 
and respect are the most important factors in this cooperation and you do not have to have a complete 
overlap in background, as long as the FST is motivated to act pro-active to offer himself when needed. 
Positive: common 
background, 
character 
compatibility, 
trust, clear goals 
and motivation. 
  The negative incident is about an infantry captain on camp that suspected that one of the satellite patrols 
was going to walk into an ambush. He tasked an air detachment to send helicopter to the satellite patrol 
without informing them. The helicopters arrived, but there was no ambush at all. The FST commander had 
to convince them to return to base. The respondent indicates that the captain on camp did not have the 
experience how to coordinate air assets and did not understand what he did wrong. Besides this lack in prior 
related knowledge there was friction between the captain and the FST commander due to factors as 
character compatibility and hierarchy issues.   
Negative: lack of 
prior related 
knowledge, 
character 
compatibility and 
hierarchy 
07 Captain, 
MAC, FST 
commander 
The positive incident is in an training scenario with German infantry. It involved a convoy that had to get 
from A to B. The operations went well because there was considerable time to plan and the MAC was open 
for suggestions. Character compatibility was not relevant because soldiers should get along based on their 
professionalism. The MAC was dependent of the FST for his communications with other units. This made 
communication with FST a necessity for the MAC. 
Positive: 
considerable time, 
necessity 
  The negative incident involves an operation in urban terrain with marine infantry in which there was not any 
time for planning with all the enablers, the MAC did not have any prior related knowledge concerning the 
FST. This resulted that the FST was not used for its original purpose and the MAC did not apply advice that 
was given to him by the FST commander. 
Negative:  
lack of prior 
related 
knowledge, lack 
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of time. 
08 Sergeant-
Major, 
sniper 
The positive incident involves a patrol that gets into a troops in contact situation. The respondent is in the 
vicinity of the MAC and advices him to deploy sniper to fight to opposing military forces. The respondent 
indicates that the MAC did not have much knowledge on snipers. 
Positive: 
openness 
  The negative incident involves a patrol in which the snipers have cover a patrol, but are left in place instead 
of being used as active coverage. The respondent indicates that MAC’s are willing to use snipers, but do not 
employ them as effective as they could be. The respondent indicates this is due to a lack of understanding of 
the weapon despite several capability briefs and demonstrations. The respondent also indicates that this lack 
in understanding is fuelled by the lack of sniper officers that bridge the mental model gap between snipers, 
that are generally non-commissioned officers  and MAC’s, that are generally officers. 
Negative: 
 lack of prior 
related 
knowledge, high 
level of tacit 
knowledge, 
hierarchy. 
09 Sergeant-
Major, 
mortars, 
forward 
observer 
FST 
The positive incident involves a patrol in which the respondent is able to give a thorough capability brief. 
The MAC made use of the respondents capability. Eventually the patrol went very well. 
Positive: 
openness 
  The negative incident is an cooperation with the same MAC as in the positive incident. This incident is 
about a reconnaissance patrol in hostile territory. The respondent is gets information that a large number of 
people is getting in position only a few hundred meter ahead of them. His experience tells him this is not 
right and he informs the MAC. He fails to convince the MAC of the seriousness of the situation and they 
walk into an ambush, which they barely escape alive. The respondent indicates that he found it hard to 
Negative: 
 lack of prior 
related 
knowledge, high 
level of tacit 
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convince the MAC of his advice based on his extensive experience. The respondent also indicates that he 
does not know exactly why the MAC, that in earlier operations always listened to him, did not listen this 
time. He suspects the higher risk, stress and tense situation might have been a factor. 
knowledge, stress 
10 Sergeant-
Major, 
sniper 
The positive incident involved the same incident as with respondent 05. The MAC was stood very open to 
suggestions from his enablers. Especially when faced with a shortage of manpower to achieve the goals of 
the operation. 
Positive: 
Openness and 
necessity 
  The negative incident involves MAC’s that are not familiar with the capabilities of the sniper despite having 
received a capability brief. The respondent indicates that a capability brief might not be sufficient to give 
MAC’s an good insight and that the answer to this lies in letting the MAC’s build up some experience with 
employing the weapon. The respondent indicates that when the MAC has not got a good view on the 
capabilities he might be reluctant to use it out of fear of the unkown. 
Negative:  
lack of prior 
related knowledge 
11 Major, 
MAC, SF 
The positive incident involves the cooperation between several enablers and marine special forces (SF). The 
SF have a different modus operandi then the infantry and thus no overlap with different enablers. Enablers 
were much more passively used. In cases of troops in contact the enablers would be held back and the SF 
would deal with the opposing militants. This approach worked because essential enablers like the FST was 
already an integrated part of the SF. 
Positive: prior 
related 
knowledge, no 
necessity. 
  The negative incident involved an operation in which attached infantry in the enabler role had forsaken their 
guard duty with the vehicles in order to conduct own operations. The respondent indicates that enablers that 
get attached to the SF have a certain expectation from working with SF. When the assigned task was not 
exciting enough the infantry decided to conduct their own reconnaissance, fully unaware of the enormous 
consequences this might have. Because it takes quite some time to learn the modus operandi of the SF in 
particular and to learn the do’s and don’ts this inexperienced group made a capital mistake. 
Negative: lack of 
prior related 
knowledge and 
high level tacit 
knowledge. 
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12 Major, 
MAC, 
forward 
observer, 
forward air 
controller 
The positive incident involved the cooperation with enablers in general. Enablers are usually skilled, 
motivated specialist that are eager to offer their services and are keen to teach the MAC everything about 
their métier. They have the opportunity to have input in the planning process.  
Positive: 
Motivation, 
openness 
  The negative incident involves the possible discrepancy between the thinking level between non-
commissioned officers and officers. Counter insurgency operations are complex and non-commissioned 
officers are not always able to grasp this complexity, because they have not had the education for it. This 
works both ways. Officers are not always able  to grasp more practical do’s and don’ts that non-
commissioned officer do understand.  
Negative: Prior 
related 
knowledge, lack 
of tacit 
knowledge 
13 Major, 
MAC, 
forward air 
controller 
The positive incident is an convoy protection operation. The MAC lacks any knowledge on the use of the 
FST. However he is very clear in the effect (goal) he wants to achieve, which makes it easy for the enablers 
to provide input that helps achieve the desired endstate. The MAC is very open to suggestions. 
Positive:  
Clear goals, 
openness 
  The negative incident involves a patrol with a MAC that did not involve his enablers in the planning of the 
operation. He was not open to suggestions and was not skilled in the cooperation with enablers. When 
certain opportunities appeared, he was not willing to exploit them due to his closed attitude towards 
enablers. The respondent indicates that the MAC was stuck in his comfort zone and was not working to 
achieve a certain effect/goal but to confirm his working methods. 
Negative:  
No openness, 
confirmation bias, 
no clear goals. 
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Appendix E: Used quotes  
Knowledge characteristics 
Respondent 13 “Compare it with getting your driver’s licence. The Dutch and NATO course are very good and this has been acknowledged by the 
Americans. You learn how to drop a bomb safely and to deconflict with other assets. But this doesn’t mean you are a good forward 
air controller. I’ve seen this during my first deployment. I only trained there. Four times a week. Yes, it was a quiet deployment. So 
we started simulating attacks. This way I learned the craft which prepared me for Uruzgan.” 
Respondent 9 “….That cooperation went really well, but in the end nothing happened. So that relation didn’t experience any strain. If something 
does really happen, in comparison with the bad example, I immediately felt something was going terribly wrong. It didn’t feel 
right. If you have to transfer that feeling….That is really hard. It can become a struggle.”. 
 
Respondent 2 “Yes, that is experience. I notice, now I’m an enabler myself, that you can give several briefings to those guys, I give them myself 
and I have received briefings from them. Some things they do remember, but to really know what you can do and can’t do, you will 
need the enabler. He will advice you on the spot. He has the explicit and tacit knowledge and transfers it to you on the spot. You 
have to experience that on the spot.” 
Respondent 2 “After the preparation and the deployment you are quite skilled with all the different assets. But during the preparation and the 
deployment you are not able to know everything. That is why you have that enabler who mustn’t forget it. That doesn’t forget it.” 
Respondent 12 “I would go for tacit knowledge. You have to invest in that. Assuming everyone has explicit knowledge. That is an assumption I 
think you can make. You can’t take 100% tacit knowledge to the deployment. You take your experience and knowledge of weapon 
systems. During the deployment you are faced with different rules of engagement and you will encounter different situations than 
in earlier deployments. That makes counter-insurgency so difficult. The question is whether the experience from an earlier 
counter-insurgency operation is relevant in the counter-insurgency operation”. 
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Rationality 
Respondent 3 “You receive your orders. You analyse them and start looking for the bosses, the commanders of the different enablers and you go 
into a meeting. You ask them: How can we complete this assignment? It is parallel planning and combined planning.”.  
Respondent 10 “He roughly explained the assignment and asked the enablers what they could do to complete this assignment and he adjusted his 
plan on that information. This meant for us that we had some input in the execution of the plan…….. this was an pleasant 
experience.” 
Respondent 13 “If the MAC has not got the knowledge and is not open minded, then you the FST is not of use to you. If you have someone that is 
open or has the knowledge and experience already, then the cooperation will be very good.” 
Respondent 13 “He was very clear. Make sure that the effect is that the spotters and mortar line are disabled. He didn’t know anything about fire 
support. He was clearly someone who thought in term of effects. He indicated that if we could solve the problem he would be able 
to achieve his effect. That’s the only thing that is needed. Eventually F-15’s took  out the spotter positions and mortar line. The 
mortar fire stopped and the convoy could proceed safely. In this case you had someone who didn’t have any knowledge, because 
isn’t trained in the use of enablers in the army course, but he was open and accepted the advice the enablers gave him and he was 
very clear what effect he wanted to achieve and he communicated that effect very well with the enablers. If you cooperate which 
such a mindset it will be a guarantee for success. Effect based operations are the key to success. You can tell all kinds information, 
but what is it you want to achieve. “. 
Respondent 13 “The MAC wasn’t trained to work with enablers. If you don’t have any knowledge, you are able to find out what kind of enablers 
you have in the area of operations and you have to open yourself up to them. He was very stubborn and you already see that it will 
not work. I believe that thinking in effect is important. If you don’t think in effects you will go out with you reconnaissance platoon 
with the mindset: we are going to have three great days operating the way we are used to, only watching and informing command 
what we see.” 
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Communicative ability 
Respondent 2 “These are very important. An enabler should be very communicative. He has to switch. If my MFC’s are stuttering everyone will 
think: that guy doesn’t know what he is doing. He might be the specialist but this badly presented. I might not trust this. 
Presentation is very important to sell your story.” 
Respondent 11 “Those matter always. You have to sell a message. Regardless of you background. If you can’t get your story straight that will be 
a sever limitation.” 
Respondent 7 “The internal relations….. no, especially in a international context… you don’t experience any hindrance. Then it is more like, 
what can I do for you and what can you do for me.” 
Respondent 3 “It was almost at the end of the mission. I was… we drove through a valley and we were looking for a position for the night. We 
found a position on the high ground and we drove up there without searching. The engineers later indicated that that was very 
dangerous. There was a certain tension between me and the engineers” 
 
Personal differences 
Respondent 2 “I put out the guidelines and everybody understands. You have to spend more time planning. Everybody moves in that direction. 
The endstate has become much more important. I do not have negative experiences with enablers because we had an open 
planning.” 
Respondent 6 “That we both knew what was important. What the priority lay, and the priority was with the unit. We had three casualties, but it 
was also important to get the rest of the unit back to base, because this was also important for the mission.” 
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Respondent 13 ”He was very clear: make sure that the effect on the battlefield is that the spotters and mortar line. He did not have any prior 
related knowledge on fire support. He was someone who clearly thought in effects.” 
Respondent 2 “You have to, you can know everything yourself as a lieutenant. After a preparation period and a deployment, you 
reasonably well know how to use the enablers. But during the preparation and the first month of the deployment you will 
not…. And you do not need to know everything. You are allowed to forget things. That why you have the enabler. He won’t 
forget it. The only disadvantage is that some enablers have different objectives. This provides friction.”  
 
 
Motivation 
Respondent 3 “I’ve seen only intrinsic motivation during deployments. You don’t become a marine or soldier for nothing. I haven’t seen people 
that go to Afghanistan because it pays so well.”. 
Respondent 5 “and when someone pushes the button they are very to show everybody who they are. The same is true for the snipers. That are 
guys you don’t have to motivate. They do that nine out ten times themselves. That is a nice cooperation. They are able to tell their 
story quite enthusiastically and are able to convince people that way.”. 
Respondent 2 “Yes, you have to have an interest for it. If you don’t want to know it, there will be no one that will tell you that you have to know 
it. When I look at myself and my colleagues , we all saw the necessity to know what everyone is doing, however at a certain point 
you get overfed with knowledge. Then you’re tired, and you will not go to the enablers to ask him what it is he exactly does. The 
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interest should also be drawn by the enablers themselves. They should involve you. That is his responsibility.”. 
Respondent 5  “It’s intrinsic, because they are specialists. They are marines but they have chosen to specialize. Those guys are proud to do what 
they do and are keen on letting others know what they are capable of.”. 
Respondent 12 “Marines in general have a passion for their work. That is good. We had a sergeant of the mortars that had specialized only 
several week before deployment, which had only limited experience with the mortars. He said literarily that he did it for the 
money. If you are really in for the money you won’t make it, but I would like to describe him as an exception,”. 
 
Divergent objectives 
Respondent 6 “Then you will see that… for me it is important that you respect each other. You don’t need to hug and you don’t have to be best 
friends, as long as you respect each other and the others professionalism and have mind what matters most. Than the cooperation 
will go well.” 
Respondent 2 “We had several tense moments, but because there was a personal click, this went fairly easy.” 
Respondent 4 “The relationship is a bit of common background. Which helps from day one. At a certain point you are configured to each other.”    
Respondent 5 “Towards the end of the mission it improved. It was about getting to know each other. When they knew what I wanted, they 
managed to keep that up for a while.” 
Respondent 6 “ That was not optimal, that was not optimal after the incident either. This has to do with several reasons which I won’t explain. 
But there was friction between him and me. But also between my forward air controller and him. They had been in the same 
POTOM… and if you speaing about trust and respect… well I did not have that for him. He might have had it for me, but I did not 
have any confidence in has capabilities. That was hard, that was an issue, but I think that most of all inexperience the inexperience 
with our role was an issue.” 
Respondent 2 “If I compare that with the experience I had with the marine assault engineers. Those were all marines that I knew from mountain- 
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and winterexercises. You know them personally, but there was also a  feeling that we were all marines. That is a much easier 
mentality to work with.” 
Respondent 7 “The personal relation…. Nee, certainly not in a international context…. You don’t experience that very often. Than it is more 
what can I do for you and what can you do for me?” 
 
 
Prior related knowledge 
Respondent 4 “It makes a difference if you already have some idea what the Pantserhouwitser or different types of plane and helicopters are. 
That is a great help.”. Respondent 5(enabler) confirms that: “Yes, I think it works that way. I can see it out of my own experience. 
I’ve been a forward air controller and I got placed with the fire support platoon. You can obtain knowledge more easily. If you 
already been on an exercise with the army engineers and you encounter them again on a deployment then the knowledge transfer 
goes much easier because you adapt your communicative skills on them. The same applies to platoon commanders that I have 
supported. The cooperation with someone with more experience was much easier than with a young inexperienced lieutenant. Not 
that he wasn’t motivated, but the picture still had to be filled in.”. 
Respondent 7 “That is one of the most important factors for the success of the marine FST. Almost every FST commander has been a MAC as 
well. You know what an infantry unit is capable of and what they do. This is a great help when you want to inform the MAC of 
what you are capable of and how you can support him. That would be different if you only have technical knowledge on the assets 
that you provide and you don’t have any experience from the ‘other side’.” 
Respondent 5 “When you are longer in the service you tend to get stuck in fixed patterns. You see that quite often with company commanders, 
who are ten years older than we are, that when they have to work with enablers they don’t know and they don’t know what to do 
with them. So it is not only on the platoon level. I think it is even more apparent at the company level. Because platoon 
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commanders are ,in general, young guys. They aren’t stuck in fixed patterns. They have completed the platoon commanders course 
but they are still open minded and like to work efficiently.”. 
Respondent 13 “It contributes to the succes of the MAC and the enabler. For someone that has experienced…. if your world exists out 30 to 40 
marines that are on the attack. That is ok, but that isn’t how the world works. You have to see it.”. 
Respondent 11 “This is about the army engineers. They do their searching and they don’t want to do that at night. He is able to do it, because he 
has night vision, but he doesn’t prefer it. I can understand that, because he can’t see depth with night vision, which is important 
when searching for IED’s. But if I want to continue at night, he will think that it is unacceptable, because he is convinced that 
working at night is unacceptable. But that is unacceptable for me, because the tactical situation is unacceptable. Then you get a 
certain tension. In the end, the one with the highest rank wins. But it creates a situation of mutual misunderstanding. In his 
framework it is unacceptable to search at night and I try to explain why, but he won’t see it.”. 
Respondent 4 “My experience with the army enablers was much stiffer. We wanted the same. We briefed the same, that was clear. I posed 
confirmatory question. But when we were in the area, in my opinion, they let me down…that was a whole different way of 
cooperating. By the end of the deployment it improved. It was all about learning to work together. When they found out how I 
wanted things, they managed to do that for a while,” 
 
Division of labor 
Respondent 2 “You had to have a medic with you on patrol. We had a woman from the fleet. I had one who only once made a big journey and 
had spent the rest of her time in the sickbay. She had been her own boss She knew a week in advance whether a shift had changed. 
She was not used to the infantry mindset……She couldn’t deal with the uncertainty. Her whole frame of reference was 
different…… If you look at our enablers. They have all completed the marine course. It might be a bit rusty. But the basis and the 
mindset are still there nonetheless.” 
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Respondent 4 “In the marine corps everybody is first a marine and second his specialization. That is something the corps excels in.”. 
 
Hierarchy and status 
Respondent 10 “people are sensitive for hierarchy. What is very important that you have good arguments based on facts and the truth. I think it 
would be a limitation if someone judges information by the rank of its supplier. It does happen. If I say something, and I’m a 
sergeant-major, and if the colonel would say the same it has a better opportunity to be accepted. That is hard at times, but that is 
the structure in which we love and we have to be aware of that.” 
Respondent 11 “As a boss you have to know what you want on the long and short term.”. 
Respondent 12 “Of course it is important. That has a reason within the armed forces. It is not for nothing that this system exists for over 3000 
years. You see it with the enablers and a certain understanding or misunderstanding that exists. In the end the question is: who is 
the owner of the company plan? It is of the company commander regardless of how many effort he has put in to it. He has the last 
call. As an enabler you may give advice but the commander has the decisions.” 
Respondent 13 “A FST is quite sexy with all the weapon systems that it has attached to it. This gives the enabler a high status.” 
Respondent 14  
 
Organizational anxiety 
Respondent 9 “you are as good as your last performance. That is how it works. However, the mindset is that is better to make a decision and 
worry about it afterwards whether it was the right one.” 
Respondent 7 “No, General Cammaert had a good saying: It is better to be punished for doing something wrong, than to punished for doing 
nothing at all. I share his opinion that it is better to answer for your mistakes than that you cannot explain why did nothing.” 
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Respondent 13 “I can imagine that if you don’t have any relevant knowledge on aerial bombardment and you are in contact with the enemy and 
you get the advice to drop that you might be reluctant to heed that advice. That is the trust you have to have….. It takes guts to 
walk on paths that no one has ever tread before. You have to be very clear in the effect you want to achieve.” 
Respondent 2 “I think risk avoidance certainly plays a role at certain levels. Every time I wanted to do a live firing run with mortar fire 
controllers, there always was a reason why the company commander was absent. Because then they have to do it themselves…… 
this involves some risk avoiding behavior…..I think risk avoidance plays a role. Especially at the company level and higher up. 
Although they will never acknowledge it.” 
 
Group identity 
Respondent 2 “All of our men have done the marine course. It might be a bit rusty in some cases, but the mindset is still there.” 
Respondent 11 “By those guys it is a little bit stronger. Where does this come from? These guys did the marine course and were at that time above 
average. They were noticed and they were offered to go into a certain direction. They complete a special course and are 
considered special. They get special equipment and it is all special. At a certain point you start acting special. Then you get prima 
donna behavior. You see the same with students.” 
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Appendix F: Detailed context 
Flexibility 
Labour, resources and capital have long been important production factors in the industry (Smith 
A. , 1776). However, knowledge has become an important factor of production as well (Dean & 
Kretschmer, 2003). This is caused by the rapidly changing competitive environment that 
organizations face nowadays. Success in the future isn´t achieved with practices of yesterday (Hitt, 
Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2001, p. 5). 
 
Figuur 13 Factors of production (Smith A. , 1776; Dean & Kretschmer, 2003) 
Flexibility and adaptation are key and it is vital for an organization to be able to unlearn old 
practices and to learn new ones to maintain an effective relationship with its market/environment 
(Man, 2003 ). Knowledge is an important factor for an organization’s ability to adapt. In a 
knowledge intensive economy, specific “hard-to-copy” knowledge on processes, products and 
markets is a core competence and provides an important competitive advantage (Hamel & 
Pralahad, 1994). This makes the development, accessibility and transfer of specific knowledge 
essential for formulating new viable strategies. This process of developing, transferring, 
maintaining and making knowledge accessible is called Knowledge Management and was first 
introduced by Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Strategy is 
formulated in order to sustain a competitive advantage towards competitors and to ensure the 
survival of an organization in the future (Man, 2003 ). In conclusion, flexibility is an organizations 
ability to adapt. The production factor knowledge plays an important role in facilitating this 
Recources 
Labour 
knowledge 
Capital 
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flexibility.  Flexibility is very important nowadays and  learning and knowledge are an important 
asset to gain this flexibility and a competitive advantage towards your competitors (Edmondson).  
How did militaries deal with the need for flexibility in the past? 
The military also faces a very dynamic and competitive environment and thus experiences the 
same need for flexibility. Armed forces on operations have always been subject to much 
uncertainty. Recent social, economic and technological developments have added to that 
uncertainty and pose new challenges to the military (Smith R. , 2005; Hammes, 2004; Kaldor, 
2007). The moral and legal aspects of war have gained importance due to the ever present media 
coverage and the changing context in which European nations deploy troops (Schulte, 2012; Sur, 
2012). Conventional wars like the one that loomed over Europe during the Cold War are still 
relevant, but other types of war have become more prominent since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(Malis, 2012). The attacks on the Twin Towers shocked the world because they did not fit the 
pattern of Western-style warfare (Osinga, 2007). It strengthened interest in Fourth Generation 
Warfare in which many more dimensions are used to conduct warfare (Lind, 1989). Many of the 
dimensions are not military i.e. drugs-, financial-, trade-, propaganda-warfare (Liang & Xiangsui, 
1999). These developments force soldiers not only to act as warriors, but also as diplomat or 
provider of care in order to cope with the different challenges that the modern day battlefield 
provides (Verkerk, 2008). This shows that the challenges that the military faces are versatile and 
require a military which is flexible and adaptive. 
 
Some militaries tried to overcome the uncertainties of war by “rationalizing” war. Other militaries 
accepted this uncertainty and tried to use it to their advantage (Kuipers & Kramer, 2003, p. 455). 
The performance of the British armed forces during WO I is an example of the rationalization of 
war and can be typified as a ‘timetable war’ (Creveld, 1985, p. 149). The performance of the Israeli 
armed forces from 1960-1980 are an example of a military that embraced the uncertainty. The 
Israeli armed forces mastered “the organization of chaos” (Creveld, 1985). They used tactics from 
the German army during WOII. Also known as “Auftragstaktik” or “mission command” (Nelsen, 
1987). Mission command envisages a decentralization of power down the chain of command to 
enable junior officers to take decisions, because they have the best view on the ground (Defensie, 
2010). The Dutch armed forces also embraced mission command to enhance its effectiveness 
(Defensie, 2010). But the challenges of the modern day battlefield require more than just 
decentralization. 
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The temporary organization 
Flexibility and the adaptive capability of an organization are influenced by organizational 
structure. Henry Mintzberg (1979) distinguished several dimensions in which organizations can 
differ from each other in the way they are structured. Mintzberg  presented six types of 
organizational configurations based on these dimensions. One of the most important distinctive 
dimensions is flexibility. Flexibility is determined by organizational structure. From the six 
configurations Mintzberg defined the machine bureaucracy is the most inflexible configuration and 
the adhocracy the most flexible configuration. This means that the bureaucratic regime cannot 
fulfill the strategic goals it imposed on itself because it is not able to meet the requirements that 
flow from the environment it operates in any longer. In addition to Mintzberg´s organizational 
configurations. Morgan(1986) describes several metaphors for organizations. The machine 
bureaucracy is best described by the machine metaphor. The machine is a well-oiled closed system 
with a constant stable input, that doesn’t interact with the environment.  So it lacks adaptive 
capabilities. The bureaucracy and its lack of flexibility lead to significant loss efficiency in the 
contemporary dynamic environment (Kuipers & Amelsfoort, 1990). Although Mintzberg’s and 
Morgan´s organizational configurations and metaphors don’t appear in their purest forms many 
(bureaucratic) organizations struggle with a lack of flexibility caused by the increasingly dynamic 
and complex environment (Kuipers & Kramer, 2003, p. 454). The Dutch Armed Forces show quite 
some similarities with a bureaucracy (Kuipers & Kramer, 2003, p. 454). This is quite strange since 
the need for flexibility and adaptation in the military is quite apparent. This is not a new 
phenomenon. Through the ages many militaries struggled to cope with what von Clausewitz called 
the “fog of war” (Clausewitz, 1968).   
 
In order to cope with this increasing demand for flexibility and adaptation the Dutch Armed Forces 
use forms of temporarily organizing in hope of increasing the flexibility of the organization 
(Defensie, 2010). Modularity and temporary organizations are key concepts in the Dutch concept 
of the expeditionary armed forces in order to improve its configuration flexibility (Defensie, 2010). 
This means that when the government decides to dedicate troops to conduct military operations 
abroad various units from the Navy, Air force, Army and Military Police get combined in a 
temporary tailor-made task force which  is suited for the operation at hand.  A research by Kramer 
and de Waard (2008) showed that although this system enhanced the composition flexibility of the 
Dutch Armed Forces, the operational flexibility suffered. This can be explained by the fact that the 
deployed task force gets deployed in a dynamic and complex environment in which it faces many 
uncertainties and opponents that try to undermine the execution of the operation (Waard & 
Kramer, 2008). These circumstances force the task force to quickly adapt to its environment and 
this implies more than putting together a task force build out of loose components. The operational 
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flexibility suffers because most modules or components are not able to coordinate as effectively as 
they could compared to a situation in which they were fully integrated for a longer period of time 
(Waard & Kramer, 2008). This would enhance the coordination between the different components. 
Thus, composition flexibility comes at the price of operational flexibility (Waard & Kramer, 2008). 
In the case of task forces send by the Netherlands to Uruzgan the different components had a six 
month period to sort themselves out and improve coordination. When these preparation times are 
not available operational flexibility will certainly suffer (Waard & Kramer, 2008). In order to gain 
the operational flexibility to deal with the dynamic complexity, a task force needs building blocks 
that are interoperable with each other so they can coordinate their efforts. A research by Weick 
(1993) confirms the problems a newly established team faces when it has to deal with complex 
situations.  
Interoperability 
The research of Kramer and de Waard (2008) into the deployment of Dutch forces in several 
operations concluded that in modularly built organizations, the interdependencies not only apply to 
technical aspects, but also to organizational aspects. Interoperability means that organizational 
components need to be compatible and develop the capabilities to be clicked into a temporary 
organization (Waard & Kramer, 2008). In order to achieve such a interoperability, organizational 
and cultural compatibility must be achieved. This can be done by standardising skills, drills, 
procedures and different forms of lateral coordination and social integrating (Waard & Kramer, 
2008). The research concluded that these mechanisms were important to create a well working 
temporary organization out of structurally dependent functional components in order to improve 
operational flexibility (Waard & Kramer, 2008, p. 545). 
Although the mechanisms mentioned above focus on improving operation flexibility top-down by 
improving the modules interoperability, it neglects that flexibility requires bottom-up adaptation as 
well (Rotmann, Tohn, & Wharton, 2009). A good top-down and bottom-up balance is needed 
(Kuipers & Kramer, 2003). In order to make this distinction between top-down and bottom-up 
clear this research will speak of an adaption when a change is initiated bottom-up but is not fully 
institutionalized. This research will speak of innovation when there is major change that is 
institutionalized in new doctrine, structure or technology (Farrel, 2010).  
 
The top-down way of thinking in the military fits the architectural metaphor by Weick (2001). 
Weick describes this metaphor:  
 
“Organizational design modeled along the lines of architectural design is viewed as a bounded 
activity that occurs at a fixed point in time. The activity is largely decision making, concentrated in 
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a small group, which translates intention into plans. The plans are based on assumptions of ideal 
conditions and envision structures rather than processes. The structures are assumed to be stable 
solutions to a set of current problems that will change only incrementally”  
(Weick, 2001, p.57). 
 
 This would make sense if the environment in which the organization operates is stable, but 
redesign is needed when the environment becomes turbulent (Weick, 2001). An achitectural mind-
set blinds organizations for the importance of continuous organizational learning and redesign 
(Kramer, De Waard, & De Graaff, 2011, p. 19).  
 
Flexibility and adaptation are vital to cope with these dynamic circumstances and a bottom-up 
approach is important (Farrel, 2010). Over the years a substantial body of literature has emerged on 
military innovation and adaptation. Many theorist have focused on top-down military innovation, 
because a successful change in strategy can be of substantial importance for military operations as 
well as for the balance of power that exists between states (Rosen, 1991; Posen, 1984; Avant, 
1994; Kier, 1997). Compared to these major implications, minor changes in small unit tactics look 
very insignificant (Farrel, 2010, p. 568). However, these minor changes can have big implications 
that determine success of failure of a military campaign (Kahl, 2007).  This is shown in studies on 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Farrel, 2010; Russel, 2010; Rotmann, Tohn, & Wharton, 2009). This is not 
surprising because the conduct of war has become much more complex and dynamic and it is hard 
for a general in his headquarters to get a good sense of what is going on, on the ground. This makes 
bottom-up learning so important (Farrel, 2010) In short, organizations limit their chances of 
survival if they follow a management philosophy  based on a task organization in which the top 
management does all the thinking and the workforce only executes (Weggeman, 2000). 
 
Summary 
Technological, social and economic developments have created a turbulent environment in which 
the traditional factors of production: resources, capital and labor are not sufficient anymore to gain 
a competitive advantage. In the unpredictable world organizations try to survive, adaptability and 
flexibility are key to formulating are competitive advantage. A new production factor,  knowledge, 
has gained much importance for organizations since it is an important asset for gaining flexibility 
and adaptability. Many organizations struggle to cope with this flexibility including the Dutch 
armed forces. The Dutch armed forces tried to deal with the complexity of the contemporary 
warfare through the use of temporary organizations in order to gain configuration flexibility. 
Although configuration flexibility was gained, operational flexibility suffered because different 
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modules within the armed forces were not entirely interoperable. The top-down implementation 
doesn’t correspond with the reality at the bottom, because it is hard to oversee the complex 
environment an organization operates in. Some articles show the problems with the architectural 
top-down approach to flexibility and adaptation in different cases. The same articles show the 
advantages of a bottom-up approach to flexibility and adaptation. In order to clarify the process of 
adaptation an overview on organizational learning will be given. 
 
